

THE GULF WAR REVISITED: ISSUES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ART OF WAR

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Abstract

This paper examines the 1991 Gulf War and how it contributed to the development of the art of war since the dawn of the post-Cold War realities. The 1991 Gulf War was a war waged by a coalition force of 40 nations led by the United States of America (USA) against Iraq in response to Iraq's invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait, arising from oil pricing and production disputes. This article seeks an explanation for how the Gulf War has contributed to the art of war by explaining how the Napoleonic strategy of quick and decisive victory was used in the operation. This strategy contrast sharply with the intention of Iraq for a sustained all-drawn-out war, which is meant to wear out their opponents. The article analyses the further consequences of this conceptual clash in military doctrine. It explains that the contrast between both concepts and especially the western military culture for fighting wars was the decisive element in the Gulf War. In carrying out this research, secondary sources were consulted and used accordingly. The research findings show the contribution of the 1991 Gulf War to the increasing complexities of war. The war further demonstrated the validity of the collective security system as the coalition forces were able to restore Kuwait's sovereignty. In addition, the study is relevant as it exposed the challenges posed by warfare and the vulnerabilities it poses in inter-state relations and on the international system.

Key Words: Gulf War, Art of War, Kuwait Sovereignty, Coalition Forces, Collective Security.

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Introduction

In warfare, according to the British Military genius Lord Montgomery, ‘the first principle is to identify your enemy accurately’ (Prins and Stamp: 1991). War is about identifying both your enemy and fundamentally what objective to attain, especially because the international system is a system perpetually ridden in the divergence of interests and states articulate their interests overwhelming through diplomacy and war, and sometimes it is difficult for states to escape legitimate interest through either of the dual methods of war and or diplomacy. As such the state is expected to ‘in principle’ to actualize its interests without necessary recourse to destabilization of the international system, however, in the face of a multiplicity of interests, it is not unlikely that there would be a ‘clash of civilization’ with a tangible threat to both national, regional, sub-regional, global security and stability that Montgomery’s dictum remains valid and relevant.

The contemporary international system has witnessed numerous conflicts and wars and the prospectus for more abound. Conventionally, armies are deployed to defeat their enemy and attain certain objectives in battles. Military historian, Martijn Kitzen (2012) wrote that the culmination in the 20th-century paradigm of inter-state industrial warfare and technological inventions and the idea of “nation-in-arms” led to large scale battles with massive use of force as were the cases in both world wars, (1914-1919 and 1939-1945) but has not waned but for the strategic stalemate which the nuclear weapons birthed during the Cold War.

During the Cold War era bi-polar international system, which was characterized by competing military alliances and interests by the dual dominant powers of the United States and the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, the central organizing principle of America’s foreign policy was to contain and deter the Soviet Union and its allies (Njostad, 2005). In military terms, the principle translated into a fairly specific objective, namely to deter Soviet military attack on America’s European allies and the United States

itself. But all of that receded in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War rivalries. At the end of the Cold War and the introduction of the post-war dynamics, expectations for cooperation and collaboration were anticipated to hold sway in the international system but turned into a mirage with numerous flare-ups of tensions, conflicts, and wars.

Battles have continued to rage in the international system as state-interest remain incompatible and ever increasingly divergent. After the end of the cold war, a shift occurred in international security. The contemporary situation is characterized by the emergence of non-state adversaries being deployed for combat operations and in some instances, states use such elements to complement national armies for offensive purposes. These civilians fulfill a dominant role in the new architecture with Rupert Smith (2005) referring to the new paradigm as “war amongst the people: civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force.” The nuclear revolution, the end of the Cold War, the rise of ethnonational conflicts, and the spread of global capitalism and democracy have led to sustained speculation about a turning point in the history of warfare. Some have even argued an “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992) and gradual obsolescence of war, or at least of great power war (Mueller, 1989). Whereas others see an explosion of low-intensity warfare and a “clash of civilization” (Huntington, 1996). All of these assumptions are predicated on some critically acclaimed assumptions and theoretical propositions about the causes of war and it should be conducted.

Every war in the annals of human history was either fought for economic, political, social, military or strategic reasons. Humans have witnessed immense number of wars since the dawn of time and the prospects for its re-occurrences remains ever-present, given the combustible nature of international politics and the international structure itself. In the century between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of the First World War, international relations in Europe were largely dominated by five powers: (after 1867 Austria-Hungary), France, Great Britain, Prussia (after 1871

Germany), and Russia. There was always a clear distinction between what contemporaries called ‘first-rate powers’ and ‘secondary states’, and there was rarely any doubt into which category any state should be placed (Bridge and Bullen: 2005). Discernibly, while there are established shifting dynamics of power realities and relations in the international system, state interests and the pursuits and attainments of such interests have never remained constant given validity to the Hobbesian assertion that the international system is ‘short, brutish, nasty. The brutishness and nastiness seem to characterize state relations being witnessed on regular basis.

The military consequence of the paradigm shift in warfare at the immediate end of the cold war era was well pronounced in Iraq and has grown in leaps and bounds afterward. While inter-state wars are still fitted for large-scale offensive operations vis-à-vis similar opponents, it is misleading to think that’s all that is to such warfare. According to global renowned military historian John Keegan, western military culture comprises three elements: moral, intellectual and technological. These three factors were dominant in the American-led onslaught against Iraq in the war under review. The 1991 Gulf War was no exception, that wars are triggered by a combination of factors such as the desire for conquest, the divergence of interest, and realist inclination for use of power as a currency of international politics.

The 1991 Gulf War code named-Operation Desert Storm witnessed the use of shrewd strategy and tactics by the coalition of 40 nations led by the USA and some of its allies such as Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and so on, on one hand, and Iraq on the other hand. With the collapse of the former USSR, the resulting global dominance of the United States gave rise to a shift from the policy of containment to the use of coercive diplomacy in its foreign policy architecture. Author and leading Political Scientist, Shah Tarzi, alludes that, ‘the American

government had been strongly predisposed to the use of coercive diplomacy because, for one reason, the strategy offers the potential to prevent or undue acts of military aggression or aggressive challenge to the status quo or core American interests and values at low cost’.

The preoccupation of this paper is to show how the 1991 Gulf War contributed to the development of the art of war during the period under investigation. To do this, it is imperative to establish the fact that warfare is historically part and parcel of human society because no human society ever lived without one form of conflict or the other. For instance, as a global phenomenon, warfare threatened world peace and the socio-economic and political well-being of human societies. In particular, Europe experienced the Franco-Prussian and Napoleonic wars in the 19th century, whereas from the second decade of the 20th century, warfare became a global phenomenon with the First and Second World Wars fought between 1914-1919 and 1939-1945 respectively. The end of WW II in 1945 ushered in the Cold War, following the emergence of USA and USSR as world powers until the 1990s when USA emerged as the unipolar global hegemonic power after the collapse of the USSR between 1990 and 1991. Thus, it is appropriate to incline that the 1991 Gulf War was a manifestation of the Cold War aimed at securing the capitalist interest of the West as against the Eastern ideology of communism. The emphasis of this paper is on how the 1991 Gulf War affected the development of the Art of War. In doing this, the paper starts by conceptualizing the key concepts. This is followed by examining the 1991 Gulf War and how it contributed to the development of the Art of War.

Conceptual Framework

Conceptually, scholars have been animated about the causes of war for a long time now and there is no unanimity or consensus as to what are the causes of war or how best to study such occurrences. This widening gulf is not agreeing with the causes of wars that have been further attenuated by a growing diversity in academic disciplines such as philosophy, sociology, theology, literature,

political science, history, and even international relations/politics to mention a few. The differences in perspectives from these avalanches of academic disciplines are essentially driven by not only substantial differences within disciplines as well, but also by different ontological and epistemological perspectives, theoretical preconceptions, and methodological preferences, (Barbieri, 2002). The undercurrents that cut the ground from a universally accepted definition or a precise causative factor responsible for a flareup of war do not obviate observers from agreeing to the complexities of war, (Levy, 2011). Leading scholars of peace studies, political science and international relations, and politics define war as 'large-scale organized violence between political organizations (Malinowski 1941; Vasquez, 2009). Many other choose Clausewitz's classical definition of war as the "continuation of politics by other means". Then if war is an instrument of policy to advance state interests of political organization, an explanation of war requires an understanding of why the authorized decision-makers of political organizations choose to resort to military force rather than adopt another strategy for advancing their interests and resolving differences with their adversaries.

Waltz (1959) suggested three "images of war--the individual, the nation-state, and the international system and used these to categorize the causes of war. Singer (1961) referred to these as "levels of analysis." The individual-level focuses primarily on human nature and individual political leaders and their belief systems, psychological processes, emotional states, and personalities. The nation-state (or national) level includes factors such as the type of political system (authoritarian) or democratic and variations of each, the structure of the economy, the nature of the policymaking process, the role of public opinion and interest groups, ethnicity, and nationalism, and political culture and ideology. The system-level includes the anarchic structure of the international system, the distribution of military and economic power among the leading states in the system, patterns of military alliances and international trade, and other factors that constitute the external environment common to all states. Although the levels of analysis framework are commonly used to categorized the causal variables contributing to war (or to other foreign policy

outcomes), it is sometimes used differently, to refer to the level of the dependent variable rather to the level of an independent variable (Bennett and Stam, 2004).

The differences among the different levels of the dependent variable are important, because war-related patterns validated at one level may not necessarily hold for other levels. Some have argued that “a more conciliatory foreign policy at the nation-state level does not necessarily result in a lower probability of war at the dyadic level, as Britain and France discovered in the aftermath of the 1938 Munich Conference” (Levy, 2011). Similarly, a strong preponderance of power at the dyadic level may contribute to peace because the strong do not need to fight and the weak are unable to fight (Tammen et al, 2000). The Gulf War was the war fought by a coalition of 40 nations led by the US against Iraq’s forces between 2nd August 1990 and 28th February 1991.

The war is also known as the Persian Gulf War, First Gulf War, Gulf War I, Kuwait War, First Iraq War, or Iraq War. The start date of the war can be seen as either August 1990 when Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait or as of January 1991, the start of Operation Desert Storm, when the US-led coalition forced Iraq out of Kuwait. The war is also often called the 1991 Gulf War, the 1990–1991 Gulf War, and the 1990s Gulf War. This dating is also used to distinguish it from the other two Gulf Wars (Miller, 1991). A consistent narrative in many major theories is the emphasis on the basic need for security. Perhaps that is why Lippman (2017) argued that “a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wished to avoid war, and can maintain them by victory in such a war”, just like Tzu, (1910) argues that “the art of war is of vital importance to the State...it is a matter of life and death, a road to either to safety or ruin.”

The term war is a means of pressing an agenda over the will of other people, mostly from unresolved differences. War is an act of violence aimed at compelling the opponents to obey and fulfill the whims and caprices of the aggressor (Amiara, Jacob & Okoye, 2018). Just like

leading war theorists, Clausewitz stated: “war is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale...war, therefore, is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” (Clausewitz et al, 2008).

At this juncture, the meaning of strategy and tactics is necessary. Strategy is the planning, coordination, and general direction of military operations to meet overall political and military objectives. During the 1991 Gulf War, both the coalition of 40 nations and Iraq employed necessary tactics and strategies as short and long terms decisions to win the war. The contending forces employed tactical strategy on the movement of troops and employment of weapons and weaponry to the battlefield to win the war. Battlefield strategy and tactics are the art and science of employing forces to achieve security objectives. Therefore, while a tactic is an art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war. Tactics can be categorized into location, unit, and individual. However, some tactics can be undertaken both by individuals and units. Tactics are concerned with doing the job right, and higher levels of strategy are concerned with doing the right job (Nwamagyi, 2019). Given the size, training, and morale of forces, type and number of weapons available, terrain, weather, and quality and location of enemy forces, the tactics to be used are dependent on strategic considerations.

Antecedents to the 1991 Gulf War

Throughout the Cold War, Iraq had been an ally of the Soviet Union, and there was a history of friction between it and the United States which calmed during the Iraq-Iran war. This alliance is a reflection of the use of collaborative strategy in warfare. The US has always been concerned with Iraq’s position on Israeli–Palestinian politics. The US also disliked Iraqi support for many Arab and Palestinian militant groups such as Abu Nidal, which led to Iraq’s inclusion on the developing US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism on 29 December 1979. The US remained officially neutral after Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, which became the Iran–Iraq War, although it provided resources, political support, and some non-military aircraft to Iraq (Pike, 2016). In March 1982, Iran began a successful counter-

offensive (Operation Undeniable Victory), and the US increased its support for Iraq. In a US bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Ostensibly, this was because of improvement in the regime's record, although former US Assistant Defense Secretary Noel Koch later stated: "No one had any doubts about the Iraqis' continued involvement in terrorism. The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran" (Borer, 2003).

With Iraq's newfound success in the war, and the Iranian rebuff of a peace offer in July, arms sales to Iraq reached a record spike in 1982. When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein expelled Abu Nidal to Syria at the US's request in November 1983, the Reagan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld to meet Saddam as a special envoy and to cultivate ties. By the time the ceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq was heavily debt-ridden and tensions within society were rising (Cleveland, 2016). Most of its debt was owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraq pressured both nations to forgive the debts, but they refused (Ibrahim, 1990).

Iraq-Kuwait Dispute and Build-Up to Annexation

The Iraq-Kuwait dispute involved Iraqi claims to Kuwait as Iraqi territory (Gordon, 1990). Kuwait had been a part of the Ottoman Empire's province of Basra, something that Iraq claimed made it rightful Iraqi territory (Childs, 1994). Its ruling dynasty, the al-Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for its foreign affairs to the United Kingdom. The UK drew the border between the two countries in 1922, making Iraq virtually landlocked (Knights, 2005). Kuwait rejected Iraqi attempts to secure further provisions in the region (BBC News, 2007). All this precipitated Saddam Hussain's annexation threats of Kuwait, rightly or wrongly.

Iraq also accused Kuwait of exceeding its Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas for oil production. For the cartel to maintain its desired price of \$18 a barrel, discipline was

required. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait were consistently overproducing, the latter at least in part to repair losses caused by Iranian attacks in the Iran–Iraq War and to pay for the losses of an economic scandal. The result was a slump in the oil price – as low as \$10 a barrel – with a resulting loss of \$7 billion a year to Iraq, equal to its 1989 balance of payments deficit (Royce, 1990). Resulting revenues struggled to support the government’s basic costs, let alone repair Iraq’s damaged infrastructure. Jordan and Iraq both looked for more discipline, with little success (Royce, 1991). The Iraqi government described it as a form of economic warfare (Tyler, 1991), which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait’s slant-drilling across the border into Iraq’s Rumaila oil field (Friedman, 1991). At the same time, Saddam looked for closer ties with those Arab states that had supported Iraq in the war. This move was supported by the US, who believed that Iraqi ties with pro-Western Gulf states would help bring and maintain Iraq inside the US’ sphere of influence (Lewis), 1991.

In 1989, it appeared that Saudi–Iraqi relations, strong during the war, would be maintained. A pact of non-interference and non-aggression was signed between the countries, followed by a Kuwaiti–Iraqi deal for Iraq to supply Kuwait with water for drinking and irrigation, although a request for Kuwait to lease Iraq Umm Qasr was rejected (Kranish et al., 1991). Saudi-backed development projects were hampered by Iraq’s large debts, even with the demobilization of 200,000 soldiers. Iraq also looked to increase arms production to become an exporter, although the success of these projects was also restrained by Iraq’s obligations; in Iraq, resentment to OPEC’s controls mounted (Nimmons, 1991).

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraq–Kuwait border preparatory to an imminent military assault, and the US naval fleet in the Persian Gulf was placed on alert to deter and possibly prevent such an eventuality. Saddam believed an anti-Iraq conspiracy was developing – Kuwait had begun talks with Iran, and Iraq’s rival Syria had arranged a visit to Egypt (Bush, 2011). On 15 July 1990, Saddam’s government

laid out its combined objections to the Arab League, including that policy moves were costing Iraq \$1 billion a year, that Kuwait was still using the Rumaila oil field, that loans made by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait could not be considered debts to its “Arab brothers” (Heller, 2012). He threatened force against Kuwait and the UAE, saying: “The policies of some Arab rulers are American. They are inspired by America to undermine Arab interests and security (Rowse, 2001). The US sent aerial refueling planes and combat ships to the Persian Gulf in response to these threats (MacArthur, 1992). Discussions in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, mediated on the Arab League’s behalf by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, were held on 31 July 1990 and led Mubarak to believe that a peaceful course could be established (Lee, 2012). Earlier, on the 25th July 1990, Saddam met with April Glaspie, the US Ambassador to Iraq, in Baghdad, without success in the dialogue. The result of the Jeddah talks was an Iraqi demand for \$10 billion to cover the lost revenues from Rumaila (Freedman & Karsh, 1993); Kuwait offered \$500 million (Fetter, Lewis & Gronlund, 1993), grossly unsatisfactory to Iraq. The Iraqi response was to immediately order an invasion (Kifner, 1991), which started on 2 August 1990, with the bombing of Kuwait’s capital, Kuwait City. At the time of the invasion, the Kuwaiti military was believed to have numbered 16,000 men, arranged into three armored, one mechanized infantry, and one under-strength artillery brigade (Atkinson & Balz, 1991).

Despite Iraqi saber-rattling, Kuwait did not mobilize its force; the army had been stood down on 19 July, and at the time of the Iraqi invasion many Kuwaiti military personnel was on leave. Iraqi commandos infiltrated the Kuwaiti border first to prepare for the major units, which began the attack at midnight. The Iraqi attack had two prongs, with the primary attack force driving south straight for Kuwait City down the main highway, and a supporting attack force entering Kuwait farther west, but then turning and driving east, cutting off Kuwait City from the country’s southern half. The commander of a Kuwaiti armored battalion, 35th Armored Brigade, deployed them against the Iraqi attack and was able to conduct a robust defense at the Battle of the Bridges near Al Jahra, west of

Kuwait City (Fisk, 2007). Kuwaiti aircraft scrambled to meet the invading force, but approximately 20% were lost or captured. A few combat sorties were flown against Iraqi ground forces (Crocker III, 2006).

The main Iraqi thrust into Kuwait City was conducted by commandos deployed by helicopters and boats to attack the city from the sea, while other divisions seized the airports and two airbases. The Iraqis attacked the Dasman Palace, the Royal Residence of Kuwait's Emir, Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, which was defended by the Emiri Guard supported with M-84 tanks. In the process, the Iraqis killed Fahad Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Emir's youngest brother. Within 12 hours, most resistance had ended within Kuwait, and the royal family had fled, leaving Iraq in control of most of Kuwait (Morin & Gimblett, 1997). After two days of intense combat, most of the Kuwaiti military were either overrun by the Iraqi Republican Guard or had escaped to Saudi Arabia. The Emir and key ministers were able to get out and head south along the highway for refuge in Saudi Arabia. Iraqi ground forces consolidated their control of Kuwait City, then headed south and redeployed along the Saudi border. After the decisive Iraqi victory, Saddam initially installed a puppet regime known as the "Provisional Government of Free Kuwait" before installing his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid as Kuwait's governor on 8 August 1990.

After the invasion, the Iraqi military looted over \$1,000,000,000 in banknotes from Kuwait's Central Bank (Peterson, 2002). At the same time, Saddam Hussein made the Kuwaiti dinar equal to the Iraqi dinar, thereby lowering the Kuwaiti currency to one-twelfth of its original value. In response, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah ruled the banknotes as invalid and refused to reimburse stolen notes, which became worthless because of a UN embargo. After the conflict ended, many of the stolen banknotes made their way back into circulation. Today, the stolen banknotes are a collectible for numismatists (Fisk, 2005). Kuwaitis founded a local armed resistance movement following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (Ford, 2003). The Kuwaiti resistance's casualty rate far exceeded

that of the coalition military forces and Western hostages (Keaney & Cohen, 1993). The resistance predominantly consisted of ordinary citizens who lacked any form of training and supervision (Ranter, 2016).

The 1991 Gulf War

Following the 2nd August 1990, Iraqi annexation of Kuwait, Iraqi's action galvanized action at the United Nations Security Council and mustered a force of coalition of willing nations at the behest of the United States. On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 678, calling for the use of "all necessary means" to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait if it has not done so by January 15, 1991 (www.britannica.com). As of January 15 deadline passed, in the early morning of January 17. the U.S. and its coalition of 40 allied nations launched a campaign of air and missile attacks on targets in Iraq and Kuwait. The ensuing war became known as The Gulf War, or The Persian Gulf War, or The First Gulf War, 1991. The war was fought by a coalition of 40 nations led by the US against Iraq's forces from 17th January 1991 to 28th February 1991, code-named Operation Desert Shield (of 2nd August 1990 and 17th January 1991).

Before the military assaults, the international condemnation of the invasion had brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq by members of the UN Security Council. Together with the UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who had resisted the invasion by Argentina of the Falkland Islands a decade earlier, American President George H. W. Bush deployed US forces into Saudi Arabia and urged other countries to send their forces to the scene (Hersh, 2005). An array of nations joined the coalition, forming the largest military alliance since World War II. The great majority of the coalition's military forces were from the US, with Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and Egypt as leading contributors, in that order. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia paid around US\$32 billion of the US\$60 billion costs (Robert, 1994).

The War marked the introduction of live news broadcasts from the front lines of the battle, principally by the US cable network news (CNN) (Atkinson, Rick & Crusade, 1993). The live news broadcasts were a strategy and tactical propaganda employed by the coalition of 40 nations to win the war against Iraq. The war has also earned the nickname Video Game War after the daily broadcast of images from cameras onboard US bombers during Operation Desert Storm (Malory, 2016). As a viable strategy and tactic also, the initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial and naval bombardment on 17 January 1991, continuing for five weeks. This was followed by a ground assault strategy on 24 February. This was a decisive victory for the coalition forces that liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. The coalition ceased its advance and declared a ceasefire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq, Kuwait, and areas on Saudi Arabia's border. On its part, Iraq launched Scud missiles as a strategy and tactic against the coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel, even though the latter had no part in the coalition of forces.

The Gulf War began with an extensive aerial bombing campaign on 17 January 1991. For 42 consecutive days and nights, the coalition forces subjected Iraq to one of the most intensive air bombardments in military history. The coalition flew over 100,000 sorties, dropping 88,500 tons [clarification needed] of bombs, and widely destroying military and civilian infrastructure (Ranter, 2016). The air campaign was commanded by USAF Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, who briefly served as US Central Command's Commander-in-Chief – Forward while General Schwarzkopf was still in the US. A day after the deadline set in Resolution 678; the coalition launched a massive air campaign, which began the general offensive codenamed Operation Desert Storm. The priority was the destruction of Iraq's Air Force and anti-aircraft facilities. The sorties were launched mostly from Saudi Arabia and the six carrier battle groups (CVBG) in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The next targets were command and communication facilities. Saddam Hussein had closely micromanaged Iraqi forces in the Iran–Iraq War, and initiative at lower levels was

discouraged. Coalition planners hoped that Iraqi resistance would quickly collapse if deprived of command and control.

The air campaign's third and largest phase targeted military targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait: Scud missile launchers, weapons research facilities, and naval forces. About a third of the coalition's air power was devoted to attacking Scuds, some of which were on trucks and therefore difficult to locate. The US and British special operations forces had been covertly inserted into western Iraq to aid in the search for and destruction of Scuds. Iraqi anti-aircraft defenses, including manned-portable air-defense systems, were surprisingly ineffective against enemy aircraft, and the coalition suffered only 75 aircraft losses in over 100,000 sorties, 44 due to Iraqi action. Two of these losses are the result of aircraft colliding with the ground while evading Iraqi ground fired weapons.

Military Consequences of the War

The consequences of the 1991 Gulf war include the effective use of airpower, naval blockade, and ground assault.

(i) **Airpower:** The United States-led coalition assembled impressive airpower that was used in degrading and incapacitating the Iraqi military arsenal within the opening days of the war. The strength of the coalition airpower was put at 2, 790 fixed-wing combat and support aircraft and the introduction of stealth F-117 and Tomahawk cruise missile strikes. The introduction of the Tomahawk cruise missiles reduced pilot exposure as well as the fact that the F-117 flew virtually undetected by air radar which increased the tempo for sustained air assault with 100% accuracy on targets and delivery of heavy casualties. By the end of the first day, the coalition had flown 2,107 combat sorties, fired 196 Tomahawk missiles, and lost a US Navy F/A-18A, two US Navy A-6Es and a US Air Force F-15E, a US Marine Corps OV-10A, an Italian and two Britain Tornados, a Kuwait A-4 and a US Air Force F-4G crashed with mechanical problems. Iraq's losses were unprecedented (Ideh, 2008). The United States allied forces effectively destroyed the Iraqi integrated air defense system and

effectively controlled the airspace for its air supremacy. It was almost suicidal for the Iraqi air force to dare any form of resistance during the military campaigns. By the end of the war, 18, 117 sorties had been flown from six carriers of which 16, 899 were combat or direct combat support missions (Alonso et al, 1993). Before the war, Iraq had 6th world's largest Air Force with about 1,000 fixed-wing aircraft, including about 750 combat aircraft with about 17, 000 surface to air missiles and between 9,000 to 10,000 anti-aircraft missiles which were annihilated by the US-led alliance.

(ii) Naval blockade: the naval operations sank 46 Iraqi Naval vessels and 74 Iraqi naval personnel taken as prisoners of war and ensured that the naval enforcement against Iraq was sustained, kept the Gulf free of mines, and protected the Seaborne delivery of supplies; conducted shore gunfire support and surface to surface missiles strikes against land targets, defeated Iraq's Navy and provided close air support for ground troops with its sea-based airpower.

(iii) Ground assault:

The ground offensive tilted the scale of balance effectively on the side of the United States-led coalition within the first few hours of the war. The first blow was struck by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the Joint Forces Command East (JFC-East). The United States alone committed 500,000 troops and about 2,000 tanks while Britain sent about 25,000 troops and 210 tanks. The coalition's Electronic Warfare (EW) completely disrupted Iraq's command and control, communications, and intelligence (CI) system. The Gulf War was a space-age war in is an unprecedented use of satellites for communication, navigation, and intelligence, (Ideh, 2008).

Contribution to the Development of the Art of War

The 1991 Gulf War saw the use of coercive diplomacy as a necessary strategy in the art of war. This was a key element of US political,

military, and energy economic planning during the Gulf War. As a diplomatic strategy, a National Security Planning Group meeting was formed, chaired by the then-Vice President George Bush, to review US options. It was determined that there was a high likelihood that the conflict would spread into Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, but that the United States had little capability to defend the region. Furthermore, it was determined that a prolonged war in the region would induce much higher oil prices and threaten the fragile recovery of the world economy, which was just beginning to gain momentum (Blanford, 2001). The conclusions were threefold: First, oil stocks needed to be increased among members of the International Energy Agency and, if necessary, released early in the event of oil market disruption. Second, the United States needed to beef up the security of friendly Arab states in the region. And third, an embargo should be placed on sales of military equipment to Iran and Iraq. The plan was approved by President Reagan and later affirmed by the G-7 leaders headed by the United Kingdom's Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and implemented and became the basis for US preparedness to respond to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1991.

The use of the military during the war was another means through which the 1991 Gulf War contributed to the art of war. One of the West's main concerns was the significant threat Iraq posed to Saudi Arabia. Following Kuwait's conquest, the Iraqi Army was within easy striking distance of Saudi oil fields. Acting on the Carter Doctrine, and out of fear the Iraqi Army could launch an invasion of Saudi Arabia, US President George H. W. Bush quickly announced that the US would launch a "wholly defensive" mission as a strategy and tactics to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia, under the codename Operation Desert Shield, which began on 7 August 1990, when US troops were sent to Saudi Arabia, due also to the request of its monarch, King Fahd, who had earlier called for US military assistance. This "wholly defensive" doctrine was quickly abandoned when, on 8 August, Iraq declared Kuwait to be Iraq's 19th province and Saddam named his cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid, as its military governor.

This strategy was compatible with Napoleon's doctrine of a decisive victory in battles, a military culture hinged on moral, intellectual, and technological. Such battles are sustained "by massive size on country-smashing campaigns of conquest through decisive maneuvers, and usually, battles" (Gray, 2002). This manner of warfare aims at the destruction of the enemy's main force in a decisive battle between mass armies and was made possible by the concept of *levee en masse*. By this, warfare was sustained by the ideological element of total warfare by using mass armies and thus mobilizing the society for the conduct of war. Just like Napoleonic wars predicated by the use of mobile firepower and other new technologies, including balloons and the semaphore telegraph (Tugwell, 1989). This doctrine canonized by Carl Von Clausewitz continues to echo and shaped military operations even in the 20th century with prospects into the foreseeable future, "provided the theoretical guidance for large scale warfare: the trinity of the state, the army and the people (Clausewitz, 1989).

The Clausewitzian trinity was a consequence of the massive character of the Napoleonic war; to mobilize the full resources of the State. The three equal components of the trinity needed to be kept in balance. The primacy of policy comprehends the fact that war stems from political objectives. This finds reasonable agreement with Martijn Kitzen in a well-published paper entitled, 'Western Military Culture and Counterinsurgency: An Ambiguous Reality', where he inferred that war should only be waged in accordance with the political motivation which started it. He wrote:

By defeating an opponent on the battlefield, the state could show its superior strength. This affects the will of the enemy state to continue the war. A defeat of the adversary's main force leads to the collapse of the enemy's will, resulting in victory. Thus, decisive battles between massive armies were essential to enforce an outcome to the war. To wage these kinds of war, the state needed the people and the military. Therefore, the political decision to go to war could only be taken when the relation between the state, people and the military is balanced, (Kitze, 2012).

The United States-led coalition and the gruesome outcome of the war fitted well with the face-to-face battle, the concept of total war, and the role of technology complementing the role of the state, people, and army in vanquishing an enemy-state. The war availed the coalition forces to test better and new firepower and the flow was a logical outcome of this process. If the Cold War saw the attainment of nuclear weapons by the USA and USSR ensured mutual assured destruction and deterrence, the end of the Cold War and the Gulf war only validated the assumption of the United States as the pre-eminent power in the post-cold war dynamics. The immediate end of the Cold War and the US-led coalition battle against Iraq has only solidified this 'reality.

At any rate, the war has not made the international system any safer just like previous wars such as the European, African pre-and-post-colonial wars, including the two world wars. Rather, states have remained entangled and entrenched in their quest to attain, further, and express their interests through military means. Thus, it punched the United States President's claim that the war was waged to make the international system safe from wars. However, that the war helped to restore Kuwait's sovereignty is incontrovertible. The development of industrial total warfare has remained largely rigid by western armies and the US is not immune, even as low-intensity conflicts have continued to erupt with rapidity and on a scale not foreseen at the end of the Cold War. Modern technology and mass firepower remain decisive elements in warfare.

Thus, a major consequence of the Iraqi war forced the United States-led coalition to retain and maintain its fighting culture predicated on state, people, and technology. But the second Iraq war compelled a shift, here where insurgency was launched against the United States troops and battles were waged in the streets. The preference for large-scale decisive battles with technologically advanced equipment remains the dominant feature of western military thinking and culture. However, the nascent wars, where insurgencies are growing have commanded some changes in strategy. To understand this, we have to look again at the reason which belies warfare: the political

objectives. Traditionally, the United States and western powers, and even non-western powers wage wars in advance of national interests. Once threatened states especially powerful ones will act potentially using every instrument including resort to war. Technology and firepower continue to determine the outcome of wars.

Conclusion

The significance of the 1991 Gulf War was not essentially in the causalities or scope of the war but mainly in its contribution to the art and strategy of modern warfare. The overwhelming impact was the possibility of war on a global scale since the end of the Cold War. The Gulf War brought to the fore sustained discussion about modern warfare and its implication for the human race. During the 1991 Gulf war, several tank battles took place, while the coalition troops encountered minimal resistance, as most Iraqi troops surrendered. The general pattern was that the Iraqis would put up a short fight before surrendering. However, Iraqi air defenses shot down nine US aircraft. Meanwhile, forces from Arab states advanced into Kuwait from the east, encountering little resistance and suffering few casualties.

Despite the successes of coalition forces, it was feared that the Iraqi Republican Guard would escape into Iraq before it could be destroyed. It was decided to send British armored forces into Kuwait 15 hours ahead of schedule, and to send US forces after the Republican Guard. Despite the intense combat, the Americans repulsed the Iraqis and continued to advance towards Kuwait City. Kuwaiti forces were tasked with liberating the city. Iraqi troops offered only light resistance. The Kuwaitis quickly liberated the city despite losing one soldier and having one plane shot down. On 27 February, Saddam ordered a retreat from Kuwait, and President Bush declared it liberated. In coalition-occupied Iraqi territory, a peace conference was held where a ceasefire agreement was negotiated and signed by both sides.

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