A CRITICAL REVIEW OF AGENDA 2063: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR AFRICA'S ECONOMIC RENAISSANCE

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Abstract

The paper examines the place and condition of Africa in the global economic index and the imperative to shift the narrative by way of changing course from the present sordid reality. The dominant absence of development in the continent remains a sore point which contemporary issues in a globalized world have further accentuated by reaffirming the continent as a laggard within the international political system. The study relied on secondary and tertiary sources for data. The study submits that despite the prospects for a more robust and sustainable contribution of the continent to the world economy, it has been unable to compete favourably in the global marketplace or even at the intra-states level within the continent because of the absence of the requisite political will and comprehensive road map to end the cycles of bad governance and economic crisis which has held the continent down for ages. Hence, this study calls on the African leaders to ensure that Agenda 2063 is vigorously implemented and thus making Africa both competitive and not falling into the tepidness which was the lot of previous continental initiatives.

Keywords: Africa, Development, African Union, Agenda 2063, Prospects, Challenges

Introduction

Lack of development and the failure of its political elite to utilize the continent's plenteous human and mineral resources is seen as a major bane of Africa's challenge and has fuelled the continent's continuous role as an unequal partner in the areas of global trade, industrialization, technology development, learning, and applications. This, in the wording

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of Olayode (2016) has "reinforced the north-south divide in the effects of globalization." The continent is viewed as a basket of hopelessness and constant retrogression. Tony Blair (1997) asserted that "the state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world". It is this realization that has fuelled a measure of response by the potpourri responses. Atah (2017, p.1) opined, "in realization of this fact, African countries both at the national and collective levels have been evolving national and supranational development strategies to address this challenge." Readings have revealed that Africa's development initiatives are inspired by the poverty and absence of development ravaging the entire continent.

It is on record that Africa is a prostrate continent and needs to move one way or the other to break the cycle of crisis that has plagued it ever since. The concept of development is amorphous and lacks a universally accepted definition, however, the quest for development has been long and arduous in Africa and all indices for measuring it have not been substantially met. Largely, there has been a sustained vociferous agitation to seek redress. This thirst for development has remained a mirage in the ensuing decades after the 'wave of independence' that swept through the continent in the early and mid-1960s. Africa continues to dominate global headlines for all the wrong reasons; such as wars, famine, governance deficit, absence of critical assets, health crises, etc. The continent remains a political space of dubious narratives and dismal results. Various adjectives have been adopted to reference the continent such as "parasitic", "lame", "roguery" and "beggarly." Some commentators further assert that the continent was born with a 'disability of instability' in reference to the fragility and fragmentary structure of states within the continent and in reference to their artificiality that emanated from purely colonial creation and exploitation. These enduring legacies entrenched by slavery, colonialism, and economic exploitation remain a huge challenge yet to be redressed even in the wake of the 21st century.

Indeed, while the fate of the continent hangs in the balance, some commentators have honestly made assertions that the continent is not an entirely lost case as all it has to do is to muster the required political will to redress the situation and mainly because of its endowments. As Obasanjo (1998, p.1) asserted, the continent is still grappling with enduring impressions which portrayed Africa as a dark continent of wildlife, where very little else human activities happen apart from drought, famine, disease, incessant coups, civil wars, mismanagement, population explosion, insurgencies/terrorism, brain drain, social disorder and corruption mainly deriving from our colonial past and slavery and the slave trade, is simply unacceptable. Hitherto, most of the socio-political problems which are

threatening the foundations of the continent have lingered for decades. While Africa's efforts at fostering development and stability have remained largely unrealized due in part to both domestic and external factors, the pull to shift away from its morass of problems has never waned. In the process, the African continent has become an object of what Mkandawire (1998) refers to as a "maladjustment" continent. While it is indeed factual that Africa needs reforms and accompanying development, the question is what manner of reforms and development will be acceptable?

These concerns for Africa to shape up are informed by the thinking that, "today's world has thus come to be described, especially by mainstream scholars, as a "global village" of integrated economies, culture, technology, and even governance" (Nwoke 2011, p.69). These portrayals and other uncomplimentary realities; poor economic ratings and political mishaps make the case for Agenda 2063 inevitable. Agenda 2063, an African Union development programme designed for synergy, collaboration, and partnership at the continental level to revamp Africa's latent potential from the doldrums which has characterized the continent in contemporary times calls for the support of all African leaders at all levels. In charting Africa's development trajectory over the next 50 years, Agenda 2063 delineates roles for each stakeholder such as those of the regional economic communities, member-states, civil societies, and the private sector.

More importantly, the agenda draws from existing policy frameworks such as the Lagos Plan of Action, the Abuja Treaty, and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Among other aspirations, Agenda 2063 seeks to achieve a peaceful and secure Africa. Towards this end, the roadmap is clear on the 'how' and 'when' and tasks assigned are of paramount importance for it not to end the way of all previous frameworks. For that not to happen, this will require shared responsibility, periodic evaluation, and accountability, if the much-touted willingness of revamping the continent is within the target date for actualization.

Theoretical Framework

Theoretically, given the growing relevance of and agitations for the African condition, the Complex Interdependence Theory is here adopted for critical analysis of the issue. Complex interdependence theory emerged in response to the Realist perspective in International Relations and it rejects substantially the former's narrow focus on the state as the ultimate arbiter in the international system. Two scholars, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane pioneered the theory. They argued that world politics is not necessarily a competitive arena that is exclusively dominated by nation-states. They

advanced the view that the emergence and proliferation of non-state actors within the international system have vitiated such arrogated power and prestige usually attached to state actors. They insisted that multinational corporations, transnational advocacy networks, violent non-state actors, religious groups, transnational diaspora communities, and many more are no less important.

Although definitions of realism differ in detail, they have a shared view of the international system and how it operates. Olajide (2021) alluded that, to realists, world politics is a struggle for power that is dominated by organized violence. The realists further maintain among other variables that nation-states are dominant actors and coherent units. They equally insist that force is a valid currency in inter-state relations. For realists, there is a hierarchy of issues in world affairs and security issues are the topmost. As for the complex interdependency theory, world politics is more complex than the perspective advanced by the realists. Hence, they believe that international politics encompasses a vast array of actors not restricted to state actors alone. This plurality of actors within the international system and the primacy is a fundamental point of divergence between both theories of international relations. In addition, while realists see a single important actor (the state), a single goal (security), and a single driving force (power), Complex Interdependence Theory on the other hand avers that multiple actors, diverse goals, and a variety of driving forces abound in the system.

Complex interdependency theory does not see security as the ultimate and dominating goal as championed by realists. As a result of this, this theory argued that a clear hierarchy does not exist and what is topmost is situational in the international system at a time. The theory does not believe that force is necessarily the ultimate tool that should be used in inter-state relations, more so, other variables such as diplomacy and accompanying tools such as isolation, sanctions, and even negotiations can prove more effective and less anarchical for the international system that is often referred to as combustible and fragile. That Africa is grappling with existential threats is not a recent development. It has been part of post-colonial Africa. Whether during slavery or even during colonialism, Africa has never been able to muster sufficient grounds to reverse the decades-long template of exploitation and abuse, rather it has shrunk further down the ladder of underdevelopment at an alarming rate. With political independence, its condition has been further exacerbated with rounds of conflicts, wars, famine, internally displaced persons, refugees, political instability, economic hardships, and migrants fleeing from certain hunger and deaths in their thousands. All of these continue to influence calls for

Africans to take their destiny into their hands as salvation cannot and will not come from beyond; it can only be enduring if it is from within.

While it is arguable that the continent is not all about woes; only marginal gains have been recorded and this does not tally with the claim that 'seek ye first the political independence of Africa and every other thing shall be added. This maxim which was a popular rallying cry for independence was not able to stem the floodgate of political crises, conflicts, and war with attendant economic dependence which has defined the African political narrative in the aftermath of political independence. Pervasive poverty, corrosive political tendencies such as the dominance of a single party in government, massive corruption, and excessive external indebtedness have rendered the continent into a servitude posturing in global reckoning and rankings.

Africa's Challenges and AU Agenda 2063 in Historical Perspective

There are lots of policy papers and frameworks which defend the notion that a united and or close economic working relationship within Africa is a necessary pre-condition for the muchdesired revamping of the continent from socio-economic doldrums. This is so given that in the first place, Africa's total GDP as a continent is so small when compared with the rest of the world. Many have assessed the issue of development and poverty in Africa and the commentaries remain less than flattery. The need for economic re-modeling, necessary reforms based on examination of past models which failed in part or totally, in the context of economic globalization and deep economic crisis, Africa was deemed to have lost complete initiative and direction on domestic economic policies to external forces. In the previous decades, Africa placed enormous emphasis on policies informed by neo-liberal macro-economic reforms in trade and tariffs regimes, social sector, exchange rate, and fiscal and financial management which was intended to foster accelerated economic growth and stability.

Africa's GDP is reported to be 1.1% of the global GDP (OECD, 2013) and with such a bleak reality, that is, if African states would agree to trade freely with one another, their combined economy would still be smaller in fraction than perhaps the smallest political unit in Europe and would therefore not be nearly large enough to generate rapid socio-economic development. With the absence or total lack of critical infrastructure in Africa, transportation, which should bridge existing gaps by providing the necessary flip for intra-state trade relations will remain a challenge. While

the need for a rapid socio-economic turnaround is there for all to see in Africa, regional initiatives to achieve success are imperative.

However, rather than being the 'magic wand' the condition in Africa deepened with low social development and governance crisis from one state within the continent to another. The intended economic growth spinning off social progress became a mirage as the goals of economic growth, equity, and social welfare were mutually reinforcing elements of economic development, thus, the continent in the early 2000s evolved into a New Partnership for Economic Development (NEPAD). The package being an African design and African-driven was designed for a social and economic turnaround. There have been other efforts at different levels to find lasting solutions to African problems such as the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). This is amply demonstrably the realization by Africans on the need to access external markets to earn the revenue needed to support the growth of the home market has been confined to lowly priced raw materials as export.

The essence for areas of competitive advantage even where it exists in an international system that is not friendly makes the case of Africa all the more compounded and difficult. Technology, manufactured goods, and technical know-how have continued to be imported at prices way above those earned from export, creating a situation of tremendous unequal exchange between Africa and the rest of the world. According to Olaleye (2004), NEPAD, however, sought to "offer a recipe for a quantum leap from underdevelopment to capitalist prosperity in which there is a partnership between the key players."

AU Agenda 2063: Synoptic Review and Possible Update

With the development of Agenda 2063, the African Union seems to be working towards achieving its vision of an 'Africa of the People' rather than an 'Africa of States'. This move clearly shows the African Union (AU) - since it evolved from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 2002 - as seeking to protect the interests of the African peoples rather than those of its ruling elites. Agenda 2063 - a shared strategic framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development was developed through a people-driven process and was adopted in January of 2015, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by the 24th African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government, following 18 months of extensive consultations with all formations of African society. Agenda 2063 is anchored on the AU vision and is based on the seven aspirations derived from the consultations, namely:

1. A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development;
2. An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance;
3. An Africa of good governance, respect for human rights, justice, and the rule of law;
4. A peaceful and secure Africa;
5. An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values, and ethics;
6. An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children;
7. Africa is a strong, united, resilient, and influential global player and partner.

In order to ensure effective implementation, the 24th Assembly of the Union further requested the African Union Commission (AUC) to finalize a draft First Ten-Year Plan of Agenda 2063 for consideration and adoption by the June 2015 meetings of the AU Policy Organs. The document presents the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan for Agenda 2063. It builds upon the agenda 2063 Framework Document adopted in January 2015 and seeks to accelerate Africa's political, social, economic, and technological transformation while continuing the Pan African drive for self-determination, freedom, progress, and collective prosperity. Covering the period 2014-2023, it is the first of a series of five ten-year implementation plans to be developed to realize the vision of the "Africa We Want By 2063".

As laudable as the framework appears, it is not without a firestorm of criticisms. Some analysts have dismissed the framework as another opportunity for the continent to show fidelity with wonderful aspirations but it will fail to realize any tangible gain at the end of the day. Why these examples of afro-pessimism are not entirely out of place given the continent's track record, it is not entirely out of place to give Agenda 2063 a chance to provide another opportunity, indeed that will amount to detracting from the fact that the objectives and aspirations of Agenda 2063 are noble, laudable and worthwhile, especially against the backdrop of a continent that needs to prove itself with a willingness to catch up with the rest of the world.

Towards Africa's Economic Renaissance

From many available statistics, Africa is challenged on all fronts. The continent houses the majority of the world's poorest and underdeveloped with widespread miseries. A continent gripped by insecurities with prevalent consequences for development; many have lamented that the continent is the way it is because it is self-inflicted. This has led many to accept "the almost universal pessimistic consensus about its development" (Adjei, 2020, p.190). The idea of sustaining the argument that Africa's interaction with the rest of the world should remain framed in the 15th-century context is not realistic. A relationship that started with the slave trade, and exploitation through colonial and neo-colonial enterprise can be replaced with the African Union taking the lead using frameworks such as the New Economic Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) and Agenda 2063 as guiding frameworks for sustainable economic development and enduring peace.

It is in this respect that Balami (2006) stated that economic growth, which is always a proxy by GDP and often conceptualized as an increase in output of an economy's capacity to produce goods and services is required to be seen to improve citizens' welfare. Growth is perceived as a steady process, which involves growing the level of output of goods and services in the economy. Growth becomes meaningful when the rate of growth is much higher than population growth. Unfortunately, the reverse is the case for some African countries. Since growth in output can be viewed through an increase in inputs and improvements in productivity, Africa more than ever is required to double efforts in both ways by pulling resources together and ensuring that the required political will is fully implemented for a turnaround of the fortunes of the continent. Economic growth and development are complementary; this is so because one makes the other possible.

Growth expands the economy, while development must lead to more equal distribution of income and wealth (Maliza & Feser, 2000). The concept of development refers to the total transformation of a system: thus, when used in describing a continent, it is indicative of a compelling redress of all segments across countries with overlapping consequences. Between 1998 and 2015, 32 of the world's 38 highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) were in Africa. Paul Collier (2007) revealed that:

> The real challenge of development is that there is a group of countries at the bottom that are falling behind and often falling apart…The world's poorest countries, a group of 58 nations with roughly a billion people,

have some distinctive things in common. While the rest of the world has been getting richer, they have been getting poorer…Their decline is absolute, not merely relative. These countries are caught in one or more of four traps: the "conflict trap," "the natural resource trap", "the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbours" and "bad governance in a small country". The countries at the bottom coexist with the twenty-first century but their reality is the fourteenth-century civil war, plague, and ignorance. They are concentrated in Africa.

Conclusion

The African economy is strongly linked to the world market; it is prone to manipulations and vulnerable to external shocks. African states' production strategy is influenced by the demand of the world market, which is almost determined exclusively by the pattern of production and consumption within the capitalist world. This is coupled with the fact that Africa is said to be "the last frontier in the global economy" (Sabo, Bashama & Musa, 2021, p.265). Perhaps as the authors suggest, Africa may be able to catch up with the West if it will utilize and effectively put to use its resources.

The way forward for Africa is to seize the moment with the necessary political will and determination to make this particular framework (AU 2063 Agenda) to all intent and purposes operational to the tangible benefit of its citizenry. A transformative leadership, good governance, and de-escalation in conflicts will make a whole lot of difference. In this regard, African leaders and peoples must be mobilized through the instrumentality of the African Union to see that all Africans regard themselves as one and share the same destiny and as such all necessary steps must be taken to avoid the turbulence which has come to define the continent in recent times. To this end, the concept of "African solution to African problems" can only find meaning in rallying the required emotive idea to roll back the existential threat which has held Africa down for centuries. Agenda 2063 must become a vehicle for Africa to re-negotiate its way back from the backwaters and morass of underdevelopment into an oasis of greatness. Anything short of positive growth, tangible economic development, social development and a gradual restoration of peace and security to show that indeed Africa has come of age will vitiate the enthusiasm which heralded the announcement of Agenda 2063.

This study interrogated the African condition and especially the prospect of Agenda 2063, particularly from the perspective of the lessons to be learned. There is, no doubt, that Agenda 2063 is laudable for the continent's development. Many variants of the development packages pre-

date Agenda 2063 and have not been either fully utilized or lacking in the political will and financial capacity to run its course, and therefore, had been abandoned midway. This study urges African decision-makers to reflect properly and assume full responsibility for the implementation and success of the agenda. The continent with the successful implementation of Agenda 2063, Africa would have shown the world its-assuming full responsibility for its development from within and not necessarily from without.

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AN EXAMINATION OF "RATIONALITY" ON PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH (JR) SECOND GULF WAR INTELLIGENCE

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Abstract

The world is faced with a series of security problems and the need to address such problems depends on the leaders at the helm of affairs. International problems such as the threat of terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction cannot be treated with levity, they require deep thinking with a rational mind to prevent or cause war. However, the issue of leadership committing his nation to war or not is been addressed within the corridor of exercise of power. Critical case of the second Gulf war had questioned the rationality of President George Bush (Jnr) in prosecuting the war despite opinion polls that were against it. Since the war attracted political and academic debate bothering on rationality, it is worthwhile to attempt this paper by examining President George Bush's (Jnr) rationality or otherwise in going for the war. The paper is based on qualitative analysis with the application of textbooks, journals, periodicals, and adopted interviews published on the websites. It also concluded that rationality is a beauty in the eye of the beholder and that American foreign policies are the instruments that any of its leaders must follow to achieve national interest based on primacy, democratic philosophy, and a world order based on his degree of rationality.

Keywords: Decision making, Rationality, Threat, Security, National interest

Introduction

America in world politics occupies an enviable position with its foreign policy philosophy of promoting the national interest, world order, collective security, and championing the embracement of democracy all over the world. However, these ideologies do not go unchallenged by certain countries such as Iraq, Iran, and North- Korea among others on the ground that America is spreading imperialism under the guise of democracy. America has its political ambition in the Middle -East and challenges to

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this ambition called for serious conflict between them, especially between America and Iraq. This conflict called for national decisionmaking against Iraq with various accusations of terrorism, possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and threat to Middle- East security. The accusation now metamorphosed into a national policy decision on whether to go for war or not against Iraq (Palmer & Pekins, 2007).

The decision to go to war generated serious political debate on two intelligence issues which centred on whether Sadam Hussein the then Iraq leader portends a security threat to America and the Middle -East by possessing the Weapons of Mass Destruction and also belonged to the axis of terrorism as alleged by American intelligence report. These issues attracted political debate and intelligence scrutinizing which later graduated from American national interest to world opinion polls where the majority disagreed with Bush in going to war including American politicians both from the Senate and House of Representatives. However, one thing that is central to this paper is the latitude of the American president in going to war in defiance of public opinions including that of the lawmakers. The power for doing so by President George Bush (Jnr) also becomes an academic issue in this paper on the temerity of the president to declare unilateral war on the premise of rationality despite serious criticisms.

However, it may be argued in another dimension that the influence of his leadership personality coupled with his idiosyncrasies are attributes of his rationality for doing so, or the issue of cognitive dissonance and bounded rationality may also pave way for him to make policy decisions on his own. The main objectives of this study, therefore, are to examine the role of George Bush (Jnr) as a rational actor in the decision-making of the second Gulf war, the factors that support a rational actor's decision-making in a nation's foreign policy for war, and also to subject President George Bush rationality into political analysis whether it was justified or not to refuse intelligence report that did not favour the second Gulf war?.

Statement of the Problem

One of America's cardinal principles is to sustain its hegemony all over the world. However, the sustenance of this hegemony is hinged on the American primacy and national interest in which the influence of rational actors is of immense importance. The image of America is seen in its president's behaviour, latitude, and other characteristics lumped in the rubric of leadership's idiosyncrasy. This is the more reason why the American president if commits any policy mistake though criticism may

follow such mistake will be seen as America's mistake. Despite this, it is still an argument whether it is justifiable for President George Bush to rely on rationality to commit his state to war by setting aside intelligence reports? In democracies, public opinions, intelligence reports, and bureaucratic and political Party's decisions take immense importance in shaping the behaviour of an actor in decision-making in foreign policy. Again, a nation's president must consider the implication of his actions in foreign policy execution, especially on war but when George Bush seemed to fail on this issue his final decision to prosecute the war against Iraq now becomes a subject of debate.

Rational Actor Model Theory

This study is anchored on the rational actor model. The primary goal of foreign policy is to ensure state survival and preservation of national interest. From this viewpoint, strategic calculations about national security and war are the primary determinants of policy makers' choices. The decision-making process of each state can be studied as though each is a unitary actor that determines national interests which are typically described as a rational actors. Charles (2007, p.67) applying the definition of verbal (1969) said:

> We define rationality or rational choice here as a purposeful goal, directed behaviour exhibited when the individual responding to an international event, uses the best information available and chooses from the universe of possible responses that are alternative, and most likely to maximize his goal. Rationality in decision-making is often more an idealized standard than an accurate description of real-world behaviour.

> The elusive quest for rational decision-making was illuminated in the crises of the Second Gulf War. George Bush made the world know that he was following the rule of rational choice in declaring war against terrorism and Saddam Hussein. He did this through diplomacy to alert the world to the danger posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction up to the door of the United Nations. At last, his rationality was criticized by Australia who challenged Bush to show evidence that justified it or else the understanding might amount to might is right which no international authority will support. Republican Senator Hagel was also worried that Bush failed to address some fundamental questions such as: what allies will America have? Who governs after Saddam? What is the objective? Have we calculated the consequences? What does the war mean for the unfinished work with Afghanistan? For the Israeli and Palestinian conflict? The truce between nuclear-armed India and Palestinian?

Despite the criticisms against Bush's rationality, he developed cognitive dissonance by disregarding all the alternative options that will not make the war possible as he viewed his own decision to go to war as most just. The rational debate of 2002 demonstrated as constructivists warned that rationality is a decision-making goal to which all international actors aspire but that it is difficult to determine when criteria for rational choice have been met. This raises the question, what are the barriers to rationality? Examining the various impediments that rational actors could come across in decision-making, Sorenses (1963:19 – 20) viewed that each step cannot be taken in order. The fact may be in doubt or dispute, several politics, all goals may conflict; stated goals may be imprecise. There may be many interpretations of what is right, what is possible, and what is in the national interest.

Expanding the concept of bounded rationality, as an impediment to the realization of rational choice promises in foreign policy making, Hahnemann (2003) said: Some of the barriers that make errors in foreign policy so common are human, deriving from deficiencies in the intelligence, capability and psychological needs and aspirations of foreign policy decisionmakers. Moving further is the factor of cognitive dissonance or negative information against the matter he is pruned to decide based on first impression or tuition. This is the more reason policymakers sometimes pay little heed to warnings and overlook information about dangers so that they repeat their past mistakes.

The relevance of this theory enables the leadership of a country to define in broad terms the foreign policy direction of a nation. Again, the concept has also become one of the dominant paradigms in studying political phenomena this is because human beings are prime movers of international politics which solely rests on power and decision making. Again it enables the analysts to understand the nature and factors that contribute to the enhancement of power and leadership behaviours in international relations. It also provides critical analysis that various foreign policies are simply the policies of the leaders in the realm of affairs and the success and failure of such foreign policies depend on the leadership in power. The weakness of this theory rests on the fact that rational actors in decisions making today give room to untamed and barbaric forces which find their laws in nothing but their strengths and sole justification in their political aggrandizement.

The 2nd Gulf War and President George Bush (Jnr) Role

The Second Gulf War stemmed from the 9/11 issue and the positive reactions of the Middle -East leaders to such terrorism. Moreover, other principal related factors generated accusations against Iraq such as

terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and Iraq as a threat to the Middle East and American citizens, for example, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Other strategic issues are the sustenance of American dominance in the Middle East, American interest in the political economy of the Middle East which centred on oil, and American ambition and the protection of Israel's political interest against Arab nationalism which Sadam criticized. Hussein also criticized western civilization in the Middle East. Others are the Iraq military, economic capabilities, dominance in the Middle East, and Sadam Hussein's international bellicosity that constantly challenged American hegemony in the Middle East.

However, three contentious issues stood out among all these factors that made America invade Iraq in the second Gulf war. They were accusation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and Threat. These issues also generated intelligence and political debate among American citizens and lawmakers. However, from the intelligence report, it was discovered that no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq neither it was an axis of terrorism nor a threat to Middle East affairs. This was supported by the leader of the Iraq intelligence survey group (ISG) David Kay when he noted that "the ISG has not found evidence that Sadam possessed weapons of mass destruction stock in 2003…"

Hans Blix backed up the report Kay and said that up to this day the United States and Britain had not presented him with the evidence that they claimed to possess regarding Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction (Guardian, 2002, p.20). However, Powell with the political will of President George Bush rejected the intelligence report that did not support the war but forced the American intelligence community to pervert unorthodoxy and make the whole scenario to suit Americans and the world that Iraq possessed these Weapons when he presented intelligence report thus: Put down a case that I think convincingly demonstrates that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and terrorist organization. And I made this case before the world again that we cannot step back from this challenge".

President Bush making up allegations of threats and terrorism and weapons of mass destruction said:

> But what wasn't wrong was Saddam Hussein had invaded a country, he had used weapons of mass destruction, and he had the capacity of mass destruction. He was firing at our pilots. He was a state sponsor of Terrorism--"(http//www.iraq and weapons of mass destruction.html)

Moreover, the political climate of America after the 9/11 episode and the antecedent threats alleged against Iraq made President Bush (Jnr) apply his favoured intelligence, diplomacy, and strategic and international support to prosecute the war. Article 1373 of September 28, 2001, gave America to defend itself against terrorism which allowed Bush to invoke a pre-emptive attack on Rough states. President Bush's elusive quest for rational decisionmaking was to make the world understand that he was fighting terrorism against the axis of evil. He made the American intelligence community predate and circumvents traditional intelligencegathering operations and presented a fake report to the public as real evidence against Iraq. He diplomatically presented to his senate and the world an optimistic best scenario of the war, introduced the "coalition of the willing" strategy to the war on the ground of sympathy and principles; applied strategies to gain support through aid and loan, military assistance, world Bank assistance and benefit from (AGOA) African Growth and Opportunities Act to countries that supported the invasion. He also mounted intelligence surveillance to know the position of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the U.K which were part of its intelligence echelon. However, he got the mandate through maneuvering of the senate and coalition of the willing without recourse to U.N authorization.

The Analysis of George Bush (Jnr) Rationality in the Second Gulf War

The decision to go to war is a foreign policy issue. Within the foreign policy decision, a leader at the helm of affairs plays a vital role in decision-making. Under the rational actor model, President George Bush (Jnr) represents a state. Bodunde (2006, p.10) in his explanation said;

> The behaviour of a state is nothing but the behaviour of its decision-makers. A state is abstract; it is individuals who make decisions in the name of the state and in doing so they reflect their interests and biases. A nation's foreign policy at any given period is a reflection of its incumbent.

Supporting this proposition Sullivan (1976, p.19) enunciated the factors that supported rational actor behaviour in foreign policy-making thus; "Behaviour in the international system is due to an individual's desire, goals, perceptions, beliefs, or other elements lumped together under the rubric of individuals' idiosyncrasies. Again, Bush's elusive quest for rational decisionmaking was criticized by Australia which challenged Bush to show evidence of rationality including Republican senator Hegel who accused Bush of failing to address fundamental issues such as what allies would America have? Who governed Iraq after the war? What were the objective,

the consequence, and implications for Afghanistan's unfinished war and Israel and Palestinian conflict? It is to be noted from these questions that Hegel wanted strict compliance with the principles of rationality before any action was taken by Bush for such war. Therefore what are the conditions that influence rationality in the decision-making for such war? There are factors such as the influence of transnational actors which reflect the decision of individuals and stakeholders who are free to make choices and contribute to the direction of trends in world politics. Supporting this, Hosni Mubarak described the decision-making process in the following terms:

> Whenever you adopt any decision in war, you have, to listen to all the specialists who argue with the leader. …we have to discuss everything openly and deliberately. Then the commander makes his decision (Rodenbeck, 2011, p.6).

Other conditions to be considered along these multinational actors are; the global conditions that prevail at the time of decision which provide constraints and opportunities for international decision, internal or domestic characteristics of the transnational actor such as wealth, military might, and public opinions, characteristics of individuals who are the decisionmakers such as values, personalities beliefs, and prior experience; again the influence of experts on security intelligence to give direction and intelligence opinions on the intentions and capabilities of the rival nations and the direction to be followed by the rational actor. Bush may have followed the global trend of anarchy and invoked his leadership rationality to meet the exigency of the time. Moreover, conflicting opinions within bureaucratic politics may have allowed rational actors like Bush to take a unilateral decision. Bureaucracy indeed favours standard operating procedure but surprisingly participants in the policy-making that led to the decision for the war may favour policy alternatives that serve their organization and political party's needs hence giving the president the latitude to choose his own choice of decision. Again Bush may have taken excuse from the 9/11 issue where intelligence report on early warning against terrorist attack was bypassed by the morass of cross-cutting bureaucracies; the more reason why he did not want the threat from President Sad am to mature.

Neumann (2007) opined that indifferences and not rationality are the hallmark of bureaucracy. Bush may have also taken this indifference among the bureaucrats to take his own rational decision for the war. Moreover, leaders like Bush (Jnr) are also movers of world history, they make history regarding their rational choices in decision making hence Wendze (1980)

opined that: citizens are not alone in thinking that leaders are the decisive determinants of states' foreign policies and by extension, world history. Leaders themselves seek to create the impression of their self-importance while attributing extraordinary power to other leaders. The assumptions they make about the personalities of their counterparts, consciously or unconsciously in turn influence their behaviours. Also, consider the concept of instrumental rationality, it pictures leaders as powerful decision-makers who base their perceptions and interpretations to build expectations, plan, strategize and urge actions on their government about what is possible (Hermann and Hagan 2004). When faced with two alternative options they can rationally make the choice they believe will produce their preferred outcome.

This is what fissured on second Gulf war issues when Bush decided to rationalize the whole option faced with a series of options and chose the alternative best for him. Instrumental rationality allows him to select policy choices that would maximize the likelihood of achieving his desired goal. Furthermore, an international crisis like the second Gulf war issue and terrorism are potent circumstances that increase the power of a leader like George Bush to have control over decision-making. Decision-making during crisis is centralized and handled typically by top leadership. Rationality indeed requires each step to be taken severally such as problem recognition, goal setting, identification of alternatives, and choice but impediments to rationality are not usually considered by the critics. This is the more reason why Sorensen (1963) argues the difficulties of strict adherence to these steps in the following terms.

> Each step cannot be taken in order. The fact may be in doubt or dispute. Several policies, all good may conflict, several means all bad may be all that is open. Value judgment may differ, and stated goals may be imprecise. There may be many interpretations of what is right, what is possible, and what is in the national interest.

Here bounded rationality is more common as decision-makers typically only approximate what is possible and what is in the national interest. Therefore what is the national interest of George Bush was to destroy the apparatus of terrorism, Saddam Hussein's autocracy, and international bellicosity and to sustain American interest in the Middle East among all other issues. The more reasons George Bush developed cognitive dissonance to brush aside decisions that are not favourable to his ambition including intelligence reports to pursue a national interest in the Middle East. Notwithstanding, when the war ended, Bush regretted his decision to the American citizens and the world in the following terms: "I fully

understand that the intelligence was wrong and I was disappointed as everybody else. Despite this, his action represented the foreign policy action of the state he was representing at that time.

Though a certain school of thought may have condemned President George Bush's rationality during the second Gulf War, it may also be difficult to condemn his behaviour as irrational or praise him as being rational judging from his apology. However, caution must be exercised following the dictum of Burchill in Jervis (2000, p.40) from which world political issues are to be addressed in the following terms: Theorists believe we should be just as concerned with how we approach the study of world politics as we are explaining events, issues, and behaviours of actors in the global system. It may be opined that the character of the actor represents that of his state and he has the latitude to take any action on behalf of his state therefore what is rational or irrational may continue to be a subject of debate. Leading support to this, Fahrenthold and Kane (2011) opined:

> However, like beauty, rationality often lies in the eye of the beholder, and reasonable, clearthinking people can and often do disagree about the facts and wisdom of foreign policy goals. It is to be noted here that the foreign policy goals of America are what any American president will be pursuing in a global environment.

It may be that part of American goals includes American primacy all over the world, its hegemony in the Middle East, the democratic institution in the middle-East and the war against terrorism which president George Bush (Jnr) pursued recently. Therefore, the American foreign policies which were on the ground even before President George Bush came to power are to be examined along with rationality, not the rational or irrational attitude that Bush may have imposed on it. Although elites, academics, philosophers, and world opinions may continue to disagree with one another about President George Bush's (Jnr) rationality on his foreign policy decision to go to war against Iraq in the second Gulf War, we may still borrow the word of Nixon in favour of Bush rationality in his foreign policy decision the following terms. The world has changed and our foreign policy must change with it (Charles & Shannon 2013, p.33).

Conclusion

World affairs attract various contemporary issues of international relations in which nations are out to protect their national interest with the instrument of exercise of power.

However, various political interests may conflict with the actor's rationality but achieving his goal of sustaining national interest will prevail at that time. Moreover, various factors may stand in favour of rationality but such a leader may possess the latitude to brush them aside with his cognitive or psychological dissonance in favour of national interest knowing fully well that his decision contravenes public opinions. Again, rationality is a beauty in the eye of the beholder, what is rational to somebody may not be rational to others, the reason why it is very difficult to rightly condemn a leader for his action taken on the ground of national interest. Finally, war is not the only solution to achieving peace and security, therefore, leaders must take a rational decision that opinion polls favour most for the achievement peace and security.

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