

## Revisiting the Midwest Invasion Strategy during the Nigerian Civil War

**Rotimi Olajide Opeyeoluwa**

### **Abstract**

The Nigerian Civil War was a conflict of great proportion that rocked the foundation of Nigeria between 1967-1970, with attendant horrors and hardships. Extant literatures on this particular incidence have failed to capture the issues in totality and some in recent times have resorted to peddling rumor and historical revisionism depending on the side of the divide they represent. This paper is interested in establishing the motive behind the Biafran Army invasion of the Midwest and how reversal of the initiative led to a chain of unanticipated consequences which collapsed both the initiative as well as the Republic itself in the final analysis.

The paper relied on the use of oral historical sources and secondary sources such as books and journals; and is guided by Grand Strategy theory. Premised on the findings, the paper recognizes that the invasion was a necessary strategy and tactics by the Biafran military to open up its intended passage to Lagos in order to seize the Federal capital of Nigeria, but the ensuing operation was bogged down by accusations and counter-accusations of sabotage, mist-steps, reversal in the objective and demoralization of both the Biafran Army and civil populace. The paper concludes that in the face of renewed discussions on the civil war, there is a compelling need to beam the searchlight on intricate aspects of the civil war for informed analysis and knowledge.

**Keywords:** Midwest, Strategy, Grand Strategy, Biafra, Invasion and Annexation

### **Introduction**

War is not a tea party. For Chairman Mao Tse Tung, war is a means to peace. In his words, “War is the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions...Since the emergence of private property and classes (Tse Tung, 1968). Chairman Mao joined other strategic thinkers that share the conception of war by Carl Von Clausewitz (1997) that “war is the continuation of politics by the other means, perhaps, is a means of politics. It is a political act. Invariably, politics is a contestation for power expectedly

without bloodshed in the ideal sense of statecraft. In contrast, war is politics with bloodshed by strategic definition.

The horrors of it have been seen in several theaters of operations from ancient times to the First World War, (WWI) and beyond that it leaves an incomprehensible and revolting scene from place to place, yet mankind continue to grapple with it both in the past, in the present and the unpredictable future. The pattern of brutality, shock and destruction most often than not defy explanations but for the exceptional works of military historians and anthropologists; perhaps this accounts for John Keegan in his classic, “A History of Warfare” to infer this “the world as fated to war”. At the time when Nigeria descended into war in 1967 the country was in complete disarray. That Nigeria was sliding into chaos and complete unnerving was obvious with the manner the western burning with riots and violent demonstrations in the North in May against Decree 34 with several deaths.

The Nigerian Civil War (in which the Eastern State of Nigeria declared itself as the independent sovereign state of Biafra) was a particularly vicious war (Ibu, 2019). The war preceded the military counter-coup of 29<sup>th</sup> July 1966 which plunged the country into another cycle of crisis, the second in seven months. General Gowon described how the mutiny which began in Abeokuta and spread to Ibadan and Ikeja but was under control thus: “All is now quiet and I can assure the public that I shall do all in my power to stop any further bloodshed and to restore law and order and confidence in all parts of the country with your co-operation and goodwill”.

Referring to the maintenance of Nigerian unity, in the light of the political turmoil, Gowon said:

I have come strongly to believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this wise, as the basis for trust and confidence in our system of government has not been able to stand the test of time. Putting all considerations to the test, political, economic, as well as social, the basis of unity is not there or is badly rocked. I therefore feel that we should review our national standing and see if we can help stop the country from drifting away into utter destruction.

The Midwest Invasion, “Operation Torch” as code named and subsequent annexation by the Biafran Forces during the Civil War stands out as the major concern of this paper, however, there is no discernible shortage of literature on the debacle, however only few have adequately x-rayed the strategic and the tactical motive. The Nigerian Civil War witnessed the used of shrewd strategy and tactics by the parties involved in efforts to gain advantage over each other. The war, also known as the civil war or Nigerian-Biafran war broke out on 6<sup>th</sup> July 1967 and ended on 15<sup>th</sup> January 1970, was fought between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and the Secessionist

Republic of Biafra. The Federal Government was led by General Yakubu Gowon while the Biafran government was led by Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu. The motivation for the war was essentially to keep Nigeria One by the Federal Government while for Biafra, it was a desire to redress blatant acts of pogrom and injustices it had suffered in the immediate post July 29<sup>th</sup> 1999 “return leg” coup which ousted Major General Aguiyi Ironisi from power.

### **Conceptual and Theoretical Framework**

Geographically, the Midwest was the region created in 1963 by Act of Parliament from the southwest region. Before this time, the Nigeria was divided into three regions namely Northern Nigeria, Eastern Nigeria and Western Nigeria. This creation was perceived as basically designed to undermine the Action Group in the western region. The Midwest Invasion was war strategy adopted by the Biafran Republic in order to weaken and subdue the Federal Military Government during the civil war. Strategy is the planning, coordination, and general direction of military operations to meet overall political and military objectives. During the civil war, battlefield strategy and tactics is the art and science of employing forces to achieve security objectives. Therefore, while tactic is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war. As a strategy and tactic, the invasion was an essential element of the Nigerian civil war carefully planned and executed by Biafran troops in order to guarantee victory in war. Tactics can be categorized into location, unit and individual; however, some tactics can be undertaken both by individuals and units. The classic differentiation between tactics and higher levels of strategy or levels of war remains relevant in the sense that tactics govern the use of forces on the battlefield while grand strategy, military strategy, and operational strategy bring forces to the battlefield. Tactics are concerned with doing the job right, and higher levels of strategy are concerned with doing the right job. In the 20th century under which the civil war took place, tactics have been termed *operational strategy*. Hence, Robert Osgoods (1962:5) defined strategy as “...the military strategy must now be understood as nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the capacity for armed coercion-in conjunction with the economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of power-to support foreign policy most effectively by overt, covert, and tacit means”. In a similar vein, Garnett (1975:4) adds that “any satisfactory definition of strategy must take into account the peacetime applications of strategic thinking, and must locate the use of military force in the more general context of foreign policy-making”. The renowned German military strategist, Helmuth von Moltke conceptualized strategy from the angle of generalship and therefore defined it as “the practical adaptation of the means placed at the general’s disposal for the attainment of the objective in view” (Holborn, 1966:172). He goes further to state that, “strategy is a system of ad hoc

expedients; it is more than knowledge to practical life, the development of an original idea in accordance with continually changing circumstances. It is the art of action under the pressure of the most difficult conditions” (Holborn, 1966:173). Liddell (1967:335) defines strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the end of policy”.

In the light of the above analysis, strategy is limited by what tactics are possible; given the size, training, and morale of forces, type and number of weapons available, terrain, weather, and quality and location of enemy forces, the tactics to be used are dependent on strategic considerations and is about the critically relating means to ends, capabilities to intentions, and resources to objectives. Strategy is informed by policy is variously defined but for the purpose of this paper, we shall adopt it as:

...a plan of action or statement of ideals proposed or adopted by a government, political party or business organization. A policy implies the action or inaction of a government on a particular issue or the position of government on an issue. It is a set of guidelines based on a sustained position on what government chooses to do or not to do (Osahor, 2003).

While strategy denotes a general programme of action and a deployment of resources towards the attainment of comprehensive objectives, some times in the interim while at other times in the long run. Aja (1991:1-2) has outlined seven fundamental elements of strategy as,

- (a) Clear definition of vision, goal or objective sought;
- (b) Political formation or legislation to give force of law to the ends desired;
- (c) A broad plan of action
- (d) Information control
- (e) Timing
- (f) Cost-effectiveness
- (g) Implementation and monitoring

Closely related to Akpuru-Aja’s seven fundamental elements of strategy, is the strategic thought process which comprises of four main stages:

- (a) Identifying the conflict;
- (b) Deciding the policy
- (c) Deciding the strategy to achieve the policy objectives and
- (d) Putting strategy into action (Nyiam, 1987).

These four stages of strategic thought process are a decision-action process that safeguards one's interest in a conflictual or competitive situation which operates within the framework of a given time, space and environmental condition. It is in this light that Awa (1984:1) said:

Broadly speaking, we define strategy today as a body of ideas and proposition formulated in respect of company, setting out its mission, its objectives in the light of forces operating in the environment, specific policies or even tactics designated to achieve these purposes and assuring their proper implementation so that these purposes may in fact be achieved.

In a shorter definition, Liddell Hart (1967) defined strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill ends of policy". This definition means that strategy is concerned mainly with the application of given military resources to achieving specific political objective(s). Furthermore, Quinn, (1980) referred to strategy as "the pattern or plan that integrates an organization's major goals, policies and action sequence into a cohesive whole". Strategy as Booth (1974:79) has remarked, "is a deadly business". It is concerned with the examination of how governments use military power in pursuit or attainments of political objectives both in peace and war times. Conclusively, strategy can be defined as the art of science of applying resources for the optimal attainment of stated policy objectives. It is the skillful combination and coordination of Ends (what is to be done), Ways (how it is to be done) and Means (the resources required for its execution); including the consideration of the Risks, Opportunities and Uncertainties (Mbachu, 2011).

This clearly makes arguments for morality or what makes sense pale into insignificance the arguments for morality or moderation in the face of conflict; what matters is who wins. It is not about who is right in any dispute but rather whose will be poised to prevail. However, it is obvious that strategy is fundamentally about 'means,' rather than 'ends'.

### **The Midwest Region before the Invasion and Annexation**

Before the conflagration which erupted into the Nigerian Civil War, the leadership of the region and especially the through the speeches and interviews of its Governor Lt. Col. David Ejoor maintained its neutral stance on the crisis rocking the Nigeria state and maintained its preference for an amicable and peaceful settlement of the crisis by all means possible. By so doing, it adopted a mediatory posturing possible because it was the smallest in size and population and probably the most heterogeneous ethnically in relationship to population size, made the Region less able to pose a threat to the territorial integrity of the country.

With the heat on for the possible dissolution of the country and at the September 1966 Constitutional conference for the political future of Nigeria, the Midwest was the only region which openly declared for the continuing preservation of the Nigerian federation with a strong center. This was based on at the time on enlightened self-interest, because the leadership feared that the barely three-year-old oil, cocoa, rubber, timber and port rich region would not in all likelihood become a target of hostile intent and domination by its larger, more cohesive, more organized and more powerful neighbors.

The oil resources in the region were such that, one-third of Nigeria's 1967 production and one-half of her reserve were located here. This made the region a "beautiful bride" coveted by both sides in the ensuing conflict but the manner of approach was how to woe and possibly win her attention without recourse to military action.

Following the 4-5 January, 1967 meetings of the country's regional leaders in Aburi, Ghana to resolve the impasse, other subsequent meetings were all held in the Midwest capital, Benin City in a bid to fine an amicable settlement to the crisis. These meetings held in Benin City ranged from the solicitor-general meetings 'on 14-15 January where the crux of the meeting was the legal implications of Aburi as well as a review of all decrees passed by the Military since 17 January 1966.

On 17-18 January, they discussed a draft decree on decentralization. This was followed on 25 January by an inconclusive meeting (also in Benin City) of senior Nigerian Officers from all regions to discuss the reorganization of the army after the events of 1966.

On 9-10 March, the Supreme Military Council met (yet again in Benin City) to rectify the decentralization decree. Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Ojukwu did not attend, citing security concerns. However, he showed up alone by Helicopter in Benin City on 12 March at which time Lt. Col. David Ejoor briefed him on the deliberation of the meeting he missed. He still was not pleased. This decree was issued a few weeks later, practically making Nigeria a confederacy. On 30 April, the National Peace Committee met in Benin City in another attempt to resolve the crisis.

The neutrality of the Midwest Region was the reason why it was able to play a key role by being a meeting point between the feuding parties in the Nigerian crisis. This much was re-affirmed by Lt. Col. David Ejoor in a speech in Asaba: "

### **The Midwest Invasion during the Civil War**

The invasion of Midwest occurred at 3:00am on August 9<sup>th</sup>, 1967 was in preparation to capture Lagos in order to 'seize the head of the snake' which was General Yakubu Gowon.

The head of the invading force, Brigadier Victor Banjo, had declared, "Fellow Nigerian citizens, I am a Nigerian, I believe in the Nigerian nation and I am fighting for

a Nigeria in which no group will be dominated by another: in which the rule of law shall be entrenched; and in which the various peoples of Nigeria can live together in mutual trust for the progress of all its people. I have fought for Biafra in the struggle of its people to sustain their right to live a life of peace in their own way and at their own pace.

When I offered my services to my friend and colleague, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu in that struggle, I requested of him that when I shall have joined my effort with him to contain Northern troops, and this is being achieved, he on his part would assist me too, by providing me with the forces that (we) would need to save Nigeria.

Although Nigeria's Air Force was originally proposed in 1958, its establishment was first put forward and mooted in 1961 following the nation's participation in peace-keeping operations in Congo and Tanganyika (now Tanzania) between 1961-1964. During these peace-keeping operations, foreign air forces aircraft were employed to airlift the Nigerian Army Regiment to and from the theatres of operation. The Nigerian Government at the time, no doubt, recognized the urgent need to establish an air force actively supported by modern facilities to provide full complement of forces to enhance the nation's military posture. Early in 1962, the Government agreed in principle that the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) be established. The Nigerian parliament, therefore, approved the establishment of the NAF and recruitment of cadets commenced in June 1962. It was in 1962 that the drive for the required manpower for the planned air force started. Simultaneous with this development, Government was in dialogue with some friendly nations on the possibility of training Nigerian Air Force personnel in various specialist fields. The first batch of 10 cadets was enlisted in 1962 to undergo training with the Ethiopian Air Force. The second set of 16 cadets was enlisted in February 1963 to undergo training with the Royal Canadian Air Force while six cadets were sent to the Indian Air Force. The stage was thus set for the training of its personnel in the country. Consequently, several countries were approached but the lot fell on the German Air Force to provide technical assistance for the local training of NAF personnel and this materialized in 1963.

Consequently, the NAF was officially established by a statutory Act of Parliament in April 1964 to serve four main purposes namely: to achieve a full complement of the military defence system of the Federal Republic of Nigeria both in the air and on the ground; to ensure a fast versatile mobility of the Armed Forces; to provide close support for the ground-based and sea borne forces in all phases of operations and to ensure the territorial integrity of a united Nigeria; and finally to give the country the deserved prestige that is invaluable in international matters. While the NAF was still at its infancy as a fighting force, the laudable plans made by the German Air Force Assistance Group

were prematurely put to test barely three years after its establishment. The inexperienced Air Force assumed the role of a well-established Air Force in order to prosecute the Nigerian civil war in close collaboration with sister Services. At this stage of its existence, the NAF was only equipped with a few aircraft. As the war progressed, some fighter aircraft such as MIG 15 and 17 were acquired to help bring the war to a speedy end. The Act stated that the 'Nigerian Air Force shall be charged with the defence of the Federal Republic by air, and to give effect thereto, the personnel shall be trained in such duties as in the air as well as on the ground. The NAF was formed with technical assistance from West Germany. The air force started life as a transport unit with aircrew being trained in Canada, Ethiopia and India. The head of the German Air Force Assistance Group (GAFAG) was Colonel Gerhard Kahtz, and he became the first commander of the NAF. The nucleus of the NAF was thus established with the formation of the Nigerian Air Force headquarters at the Ministry of Defence. The air force did not get a combat capability until a number of Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-17 aircraft were presented by the Soviet Union during the Nigerian Civil War. It is thus imperative to examine the role of air power in the Nigerian civil war during the period under consideration.

Scholars have expressed different opinions on the subject of the Nigerian Civil War, particularly the usefulness, if any, of air power and or air force in executing the war on both sides. To some, the air force played insignificant role because as at the time the civil war broke out, the Nigerian Air force was at its infancy stage since it was formally established in 1964; two years before the civil war. To others, however, the air force played immortal role in the civil war worthy of consideration. Therefore, in examining the place and role of the Air Power in the Nigerian Civil War, it is important and indeed, imperative to consider Stanley's thought and position, expressed and captured as follows:

The air war was recorded as one of the most significant technological advancement in terms of converting civil helicopters into military and war ones on the Biafran side and the extensive use of modern artillery particularly by the federal forces. On the federal side, the air war had impact in that the tactics used in the war which was generally indiscriminate bombardments, strafing and bombing of non-military targets which added substance to the suspicion raised by the Biafran forces of genocide committed by the federal forces in Biafra.

This excerpt encapsulates the place and relevance of air power in the civil war. This is further exemplified by the assertion that there were several damaging attacks by Biafran aircrafts which was delivered by the USSR. These aircraft attacks took place on 13 August 1967. The several damaging attacks by the Biafran Aircraft suggest that Biafra engaged the Federal Military forces on air warfare, causing severe damaged in a way that awoken federal government from slumber. With this, the Federal Military



troops realized the situation was beyond mere 'police action' as pen ultimately alluded, and thus, required full military action. As would be expected, this propelled and compelled the federal troops to intensify efforts aimed at procuring aircrafts to fight the secessionists. The USSR initially supplied two MiG-15UTIs (NAF601 and NAF 602), and eight MiG-17s (NAF603 to NAF610) to Kano IAP and simultaneously sent a large shipment aboard a Polish merchant. Later, six Il-28 bombers, flown by Egyptian and Czech pilots, were delivered from Egypt and stationed at Calabar and Port Harcourt to fight Biafra.

The international community played important role in the civil war vis-à-vis the use of air power in the Civil War. Owing to the fact that as the time war broke out Nigeria had not developed strong air force base, the international community played immortal role. Thus, air power mainly served the purpose of prosecuting the war in areas of bombing strategic places for the purpose of weakening the opponent. Air power was a significant tactics adopted by both Biafra and Federal government to acquire and supply weapons, reinforcements, food items, war equipment and materials. In this light, Britain continued to quietly support Nigeria through the rest of the war. On one hand, advancing a royalty of £5.5 million to fund the purchase of more British weapons, in other case, Britain was covertly supplying Nigeria with weapons and military intelligence as well as hiring war mercenaries to support the federal troops. As would be expected, these supplies were done through the air force, which further suffice the assertion that air power played significant role in the Nigerian civil war during the period.

Britain's decision to back Nigeria was partly because of the advised that in the event of war, the odds were slightly in favour of the Federal Military Government. More importantly, Britain calculated that supporting Nigeria was its safest option if it were to preserve its oil interests in the country. This was largely because the Cold War and the rivalry among some Western European states made it likely that other foreign powers would wade into the conflict. Given Shell-BP's interest in Nigeria taking over the major oilfields still in Biafran hands, it was not surprising that they overtly supported the Nigerian military course. A case in point was in December 1967 when the Nigerian government, frustrated by the slow pace of progress in the war, requested that Shell-BP pay its royalty of £5.5 million in advance, in order to enable it to purchase arms from Britain. Shell-BP promptly complied and thus, the supplies provided to the Federal Military Government by Britain through aircrafts included two vessels and 60 vehicles. Therefore, with the help of the international community, the Nigerian Air Force left their own mark in the minorities' areas as they were accused of indiscriminate bombing of civilian occupied areas. The situation was so devastating to the point that William Norris of the London Sunday Times, in an article titled, "Nightmare in Biafra," reported how the high-flying Russian Ilyushin jets dropped bombs in civilian centers in Biafra.

He stated that, ‘slowly, but effectively, a reign of terror has been created.’ Referring to the Federal government’s effort as ‘reign of terror’ was to the effect that Nigeria described the war as effort to “keep Nigeria one”, thus a mere ‘police action’, which suggested that Biafra should have been treated with kid gloves.

### **Conclusion**

Generally, the 19th and 20th centuries witnessed the rise of mass ideologies, vast conscript armies and global alliances resulting in various forms of wars. The Nigerian Civil War, for example was enhanced by rapid technological change, in which military strategy became part of grand strategy, that is, the proper planning and utilization of the entire resources of the society such as military, the air force, technological, economic, and political potentials to ensure victory. The adoption of air power as strategy and tactics by Federal Military Government and the Republic of Biafra was largely due to the dire need for victory and survival. Alabi-Isami noted that the air force came in at exactly 6.30a.m and starting strafing and bombing north towards Uyo and west towards Opobo. 3MCDO had the support of the MiG Russian-built jet fighters, taking off from Calabar airport. In Nigeria, during the civil war in the 20th century, air power was employed as operational strategy and tactic to execute the civil war. This included but not limited to the size, training, and morale of forces, type and number of weapons available, terrain, weather, and quality and location of enemy forces, the tactics that was used were all dependent on the strategic considerations air force as a veritable way of winning the war. Air power was a modern military strategic, operational, and tactical level that was appropriate and suitable in the course of the civil war.

### **References**

- “ICE Case Studies: The Biafran War”, American University, 1997, internet source retrieved on 14 May 2019.
- Achike, U. (2011), *Nigeria/Biafra Civil War: My Experience*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited,
- Akpuru-Aja, A. (1999), *Policy and Strategic Studies: Uncharted Waters of War and Peace in International Relations*, Abakaliki: Willy Rose and Appleseed Publishing Company.
- Arnett, J. (1975), “Strategic Studies and its Assumptions” in Baylis, John; Ben Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies*, New York: Holmes and Meier.
- Bortolotti, D. (2004), *Hope in Hell: Inside the World of Doctors Without Borders*, Firefly Books.
- Clausewitz, Carl Von (1997), *On War*, Great Britain, Wordsmith Edition
- Ezeobi O. Stanley, *Oguta in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970*, M.A. Dissertation, Department of History and War Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, (Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, 2016),
- Forsyth, F. (1976) *The Outsider: My Life in Intrigue*. NY: Putnam.
- Frederick F. (1969), *The Making of an African Legend: The Biafran Story*, UK: Penguin Book

- Godwin Alabi-Isama, *The Tragedy of Victory: On the Spot Account of the Nigerian-Biafra War in the Atlantic Theater*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited
- Gowon, Y. (1966), "No Trust or Confidence in a Unitary System of Government", Inaugural Speech, Lagos: Ministry of Information.
- Griffin, A. (1970) "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War",
- Holborn, H. (1966), "Moltke and Schlieff: The Prussian-German School" in Earle, E.M. (ed.), *Maker of Modern Strategy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- John Clarke, Yakubu Gowon: Faith in a United Nigeria, London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1987.
- John Keegan (1993) *A History of Warfare*, First Vintage Books Edition.
- Liddell, Hart (1967), *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, London: Faber
- Nyiam, G. (1987), "Constraints to Effective African States' Policies and Strategies Formulation and Implementation" being paper presented to the participant of Senior Executive Course of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, on Friday 13<sup>th</sup> February.
- Okogba, Emmanuel, "Revisiting The 1967 Asaba Massacre", 2016
- Okpe A. (2011), *The Last Flight: A Remembers the Air Force and the Biafran Air Attacks*, Lagos: Aero Max International.
- Olusegun O. (1980), *My Command: An Account of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970*, Ibadan: Prestige, Nigeria
- Orobator, S. E., "The Biafran Crisis and the Midwest", *African Affairs*, 86 (344), 1987, 367–383
- Osahor, M.C. (2003), "The National Institute and Nigeria's Strategic Challenges in the New Millennium" being a test of Inaugural lecture delivered to Senior Executive Course Participants of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, on Friday 13<sup>th</sup> February.
- Osgood, Robert (1962), *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Philibus Audu Nwamagyi, "War Strategy and Tactics of Samore Toure of the Mandinka Empire", Seminar Paper, Nigeria Defence Academy, Post Graduate School, Faculty of Art and Social Science, Department of History and War Studies, 2019, 4
- Plotnicov, Leonard, "An Early Nigerian Civil Disturbance: The 1945 Hausa-Ibo Riot in Jos" in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 9 (2), 1971, 297–305
- Tse Tung, M. (1966), *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse Tung*, Peking, Foreign Language Press.
- Uche Santos, *The Forgotten Victims: Ethnic Minorities in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 1967-1970*, African Tree Press (18 February 2007)
- Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), 133–134.
- Udeagbala LO, "Economic Blockade and the Nigerian/Biafran War, 1967-1970", in *WUDIL Journal of Humanities (WJH)*, Vol. 1, Department of History and International Studies, Nigerian Police Academy, Wudil, Kano state, 2016, 24-25
- Victor, A. (2001), Lt. Col Victor Adebajo Speech cited in *A Break in the Silence: Lt. Col. Victor Adebukuola Banjo*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited.