

Securing Peace in the Indigene-Settler Crisis of Jos, Nigeria A Case for Second-Generation Security Approaches

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Abstract

The frequency and brutish nature of violent conflicts especially those rooted in contestations over autochthony and land in many post-colonial African nation-states have exposed the limited capability of the Police to contain such crises; thereby necessitating the deployment of the military to such conflict-ridden communities. Sequel to the inability of the Police to contain communal conflicts that have threatened peace and security since the inception of its fourth-republic in Plateau State, Nigeria's federal government found it imperative to draft the military to the state. Despite military presence, the indigene-settler crisis continues apace defined by guerrilla tactics which often makes it challenging for the military to enforce order. Using two instances of such bloody clashes to illustrate the security-promotion challenges confronting the first-generation approach currently in place as depicted by military presence, the article canvasses for a shift from first-generation approaches of security promotion to second-generation approaches that are context and locale-specific towards sustainable peace and security.

Keywords: Military, Quest, Peace, Security Indigene-Settler and Jos

Introduction

The pervasive nature of ethnic and religious conflicts has led to the emergence of many ethnic and religious militias contesting the control of force and resources with the state in many countries. Jinadu (2007: 8) observes that there were 58 major armed conflicts around the world from 1990-2002 and the ethnic related ones amongst these reflected the global nature of the question of ethnicity thus: "Africa (19), America (5), Asia (17), Europe (8) and Middle-East (9)." According to Sorensen (2001) violent domestic conflict has characterized Sub-Saharan African since independence with over four million people perishing in such conflicts between 1960 and 1987. During the 1989-1998 period, there were between 52(1992) and 30(1997) intra-state armed conflicts in progress at any one time. During this ten year period, there were intra-state wars in: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chad, the Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, South-Africa, Sudan and Uganda. The

emergent challenges in the affected countries have been largely related to the provision of order, peace and security, the pursuit of which oftentimes defy any rigid logical sequencing. These conflicts have become nagging problems to state-building, peace, development and security within countries and sources of international worries.

This article argues that this has been occasioned amongst other factors by the perceived and sometimes open display of partiality by the state and its institutions in balancing the contending interests within its borders. This is most pronounced when national armies are deployed to intervene in communal conflicts, the loss of confidence in the state as a partial arbiter held by the citizens is transferred to its representative such as the deployed force by many in communities affected by ethnic or religious conflicts. According to Enloe (1978) when central government lacking the confidence of the citizens deploy the military for internal security operations, the military is recognised as participants on the side of one of the parties affiliated to the central government and not as neutral parties.

However, the cause of this negative perception and sustained enemy-image of the state and its institutions cannot be fully appreciated without taking the foundation of inter-ethnic relations in these countries into cognisance. For instance, indication of a future adversarial inter-ethnic relationship manifested when the question of when to seek self-rule from the imperialists became a national debate that pitched the northern part of the country against the southern part. Adebani and Obadare (2010:4) present the mood of inter-ethnic relations at independence as one in which: "Nigerians and the leaders of the fractious groups and emergent political parties struggled not only for independence but also to gain leverage over and above one another..." This occurred within a broader context of colonial political economy and state formations processes that deepened the ethnic conflict not only in Nigeria but also on the continent. Jinadu (2007) observes that since then, post-colonial politics became ethnicity by other means because it was about: to whom the state and its privileges belonged; whose or which ethnic group or ethno-regional interest does it enhance or stifle at any given time? This is why ethnic conflicts have inevitably become tied to state formation processes, democracy and development in the continent. It has also become an actuality that torpedoes the potential of cohesion and peaceful co-existence, while continuously stoking hegemonic-directed rivalry and conflict under conditions of scarcity, about who should control the state, and directs its main functions of the authoritative control, allocation and distribution through its presumed monopoly of physical force and policy directives (Jinadu 2007). The emergent post-colonial state has therefore been confronted with the task of impressing and sustaining its impartiality and balancing clashing ethnic interests under military and civilian regimes.

In the intense ethnic struggle that has characterised post-colonial politics, there emerged dominant and marginalised ethnic-nationalities who either tried to exit the state or violently engaged the state to have increased shares of what it has to offer. This is summed up in the ethnic question defined as the: "struggle of ethnic groups for recognition, equality or autonomy within the framework of an existing territorial state, or for independence from such a state" (Stavenhagen 1996:1 quoted in Jinadu 2007:7). Given the truism that military power is one of the elements of national power, the nursing of ethnic militias (armies) became predictable either to engage the state or as parts of preparations to exit the state.

Hardly had the fourth-republic taken off on the 29th of May 1999 that the country erupted in series of communal conflicts. This has created many crises-ridden and post-conflict communities around the

country. The causes, effects and likely solutions to some of these conflicts are well documented in extant literature (Albert 2005, 2007, Babawale et al 2003, Agbaje et al 2004, Osaghae et al 2007 and Campbell 2010).

Next to the Niger-Delta, the Jos crises can be described as next in rank in terms of protraction, casualties and the involvement of the military. This is because since 2001 when the first incidence of inter-ethnic violence was recorded, the military has become part of the public life of the state especially Jos its capital city. Despite the declaration of a State of emergency in 2004 and series of Commissions of Inquiry by both the State and Federal Governments, inter-ethnic killings have reached the level of ethnic cannibalism sustained by narratives of hate (Animasawun 2013:256). Fagbenle (2012) reports that: "The other day, a crowd of Berom Christian youths butchered over 100 Fulani Muslims as they were praying in Jos after which they roasted and ate them. It was filmed." In the wake of the latest killings in one of the villages in the state, (Fagbenle 2012) reports that the Security Task Force (STF) issued a statement that purportedly signed by Captain Salisu Mustapha, Media Information Officer of the STF, states:

"This is to inform the people residing in Barikin Ladi and Riyom Local Government Areas that a military operation is ongoing in the area. The inhabitants of Mahanga, Kakuruk, Kuzen, Maseh and Shong 2 are to evacuate immediately with their property within the next 48 hours."

This sets the stage for the current phase of the indigene-settler crises which keeps mutating and resistant to all efforts so far made.

Although the validity of the description of intra-state conflicts most of which are indigene-settler in nature in the global south as *new wars* (Kaldor 2006) and *new barbarism* (Kaplan 1994) have been challenged based on the history of low intensity conflicts, guerrilla warfare, and counterinsurgency before 1990 (Fearon and Laitin 2003 and Kalyvas 2001). Current typologies of indigene-settler conflicts in Africa sustained by identity and existential needs like that of Plateau state since 2001 have evident traces that can qualify it as *new barbaric wars* and not a low intensity conflict because of the number of deaths and scale of destruction it has produced. Characterised by extremely violent and counterinsurgency clashes in which non-state actors such as militias and armed groups (Gorman 2011) challenge the need control of force, space and instruments of violence by Nigeria's federal government, the presence of a formidable military presence becomes inevitable.

The Military and Ethnic Security Dilemma in Post-Colonial Nigeria

Current events in many African countries that struggled for independence over fifty-years ago has led to the conclusion that it was easier to obtain independence than to build a viable nation-state (Joseph 2003). This becomes glaring because in most of these countries, because nationhood has lost ground to sectional and ethnic identities (Joseph 2003). One of the countries that provide a telling example of this is Nigeria. Given that it was fabricated through a forceful conscription of diverse ethnic nationalities into one through the amalgamation of 1914, the subsequent adversarial relationship between the disparate ethnic nationalities who were denied the opportunity to negotiate what will be the overarching basis of their coming together could be foreseen. The mutual suspicion that has characterised inter-ethnic

relations lends resonance to the views of the late Sage and political philosopher Chief Obafemi Awolowo that:

“If rapid political progress is to be made in Nigeria, it is high time we were realistic in tackling its constitutional problems. Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no Nigerians in the same sense as there are English Welsh of French. The word Nigerian is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.” Quoted in Sagay (2009: 28).

These fragile relations have been worsened by the persistent refusal of a negotiated constitution by the successive governments peopled by elites drawn from the disparate ethnic nationalities even after over a decade of uninterrupted democratisation process since May 29 1999. Watts (2003: 26) quoted in Adebani and Obadare (2010: 382) argues that the construction of national identity requires a critical survey of the social body in order to determine its makeup and nature. Adebani and Obadare (2010) lists the failure of census, elections, constitutional conferences, and the much-talked about sovereign national conference as indicators of the (un)conscious missteps towards standing in the way of a critical survey and a honest and politically rigorous evaluation of the Nigerian project which have led to the unimagining of the Nigerian idea instead of nation-building. In forging unity within this unimagined state, the military can be seen as one veritable institution that can mediate these contending aspirations.

However, the normative expectation that institutions like the military can enhance state-building, imagining and midwifing the Nigerian idea into a reality was lost early in the life of the country due to the manner of recruitment into the military. In an examination of the common modes of recruitment into the military in most ethnically segmented societies like Nigeria, Adekanye (2005) identified three main approaches. These include; the ethnic-pluralising approach, one-ethnic dominant approach and the individual nationalising approach. The ethnic-pluralising approach aims at striking a balance among the various categories in the society towards having an assured structure that will guarantee the equality of the relevant segmented groups (Adekanye 2005). The one-ethnic dominant approach encourages the domination of the military one ethnic group to the exclusion of others. Overtime, this institutionalises horizontal inequalities defined as political and economic discrimination amongst culturally defined groups (Stewart and Brown 2009). In imperial times, central regimes relied on ethnic categories for building the military power of the state which comprised the army, navy and air force (Enloe 1978). This form of recruitment relied on tribes stereo-typed as warrior in nature and was done in a way that in turn made such tribes to be subservient to the colonial interests. Jinadu (2007) opines that this fuels identity-based and deep-rooted conflicts arising from a combination of potent identity-based factors based on a perception of wider economic and social injustice. The individual nationalising approach seeks to play-down the centrifugal tendencies which multi-ethnic diversity in the military could instigate and to tame the evil of ethnicity (Adekanye 2005).

In understanding what determines the choice made by any country at a given time, Adekanye (2005: 74) argues that the choice of any of these approaches are influenced by a number of factors such as:

size of the country with due consideration given to existing communication and transportation facilities; size of the entire population; number, size and strength of the composite groups; extent and intensity of intergroup conflict; character of the political leadership and its ideology and incidence of war or the threat of external military attack.

These three approaches have been used in the sub-Saharan region. For examples, Nigeria under Balewa (1958-1967) structured the army and society along regional lines based on three regions from 1958 to 1963 using a quota system of (50-25-25) and four regions after 1963 (50-25-21-4). It is instructive to observe that of these three, two have experienced full blown civil wars with causes that cannot be intricately separated from the way the military and army in particular were organised. This, despite its flaws, perhaps influenced the thinking in framing Nigeria's federalism which Ayoade (2009) in a foreword to Ojo (2009) describes as arithmetical and social injustice premised on the result that 2 are lesser than 1. Herkovitis (2007) commenting on the same issue describes Nigeria as a rigged federal structure.

In deepening the understanding of the centrality of the military to inter-ethnic relations, the concept of ethnic security dilemma comes to the fore. This flows from the Realist school of politics. It is a situation in which ethnic nationalities operate under the (false) consciousness of an increasing threat from other ethnic nationalities in a country as other group(s) apart from them gains more control of the state (Dew 2011). This results in a feeling of insecurity which propels other ethnic nationalities to seek to increase their power in order to control the state and protect their interests thereby exacerbating the insecurity of others. Dew (2010) argues that given the absence of a nationalising social contract, post-colonial Nigeria was founded on the basis of ethnic-social contract demonstrated by the control of each of the political zone by at one dominant political party worsened by horizontal inequalities perpetuated by the skewed pattern of recruitment, each ethnic nationality began to perceive the other as a threat. Jinadu (2007) opines that the state cum nation-building process in Africa is parochial, ethno-hegemonising and fabricated to promote and advance the control of the state by chosen dominant ethnic nationalities.

This perception of threat created and sustained by the ethnic security dilemma offers insight into the motivations for the establishment of many ethnic militias along the lines of ethnic-nationality and the description of Nigerian Army as the ethnic army of the Hausa-Fulani until 1999 by (Agbaje 2003) and on which basis he explains the lack of an Hausa-Fulani ethnic militia in the mould of the Odua People's Congress (OPC), Ijaw Peoples' Congress (IPC) or the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). This implies that ethnic influence and control of the military has come to be perceived as part of the ethnic security dilemma and ethnic insecurity that define inter-ethnic relations and politics in Nigeria. According to Adekanye (1989) quoted in Osaghae (2002:55), "it is impossible for military men, who are part and parcel of the society, to be entirely unaffected by or unconcerned with politics". This made military intrusion into politics the furtherance of politics by military means. This sowed the seed mutual suspicion and distrust amongst the ethnic nationalities resulting in *ethnic security dilemma* of the Realist school of politics; a situation in which ethnic nationalities began perceiving threat from other ethnic groups as they gained more control over the state and its institutions especially the military (Kew 2010). The situation also bred *ethnic insecurity*, a fear of domination by other ethnic groups (Gleditsch 2001).

Consequently, in many cases of ethnic conflicts especially those wearing the garb of indigene-settlers, the Police and military are not perceived as representatives of neutral central government because they are seen as deployed to protect the interest of a specific group with ethnic or religious ties to the sitting president or head of the particular institution, especially when the head of the deployed force hails from a side in the conflict or practices the same religion with them (Animasawun 2013). However, this puts a burden on the Nigerian state because an average Nigerian is either a Muslim or a Christian including officers and men of the Police and military.

Jos Crisis and its Indigene-Settler Context: Migration, Ethnicity and Prebendalism

The Jos crisis is contextualised as intractable and deep-rooted in line with the defining features of such conflicts as enumerated by (Miall 2004). Such conflicts are; continual, protracted and violent, zero-sum, central to the collective identity and existential needs of a people which they will go to any length to meet, intangible and non-negotiable human needs such as recognition, participation and security. A look at these needs shows that they are needs that the parties in the Jos crisis have violently struggled to meet.

Plateau state derived his name from the high plateau that dominates its topography. Although, counted as one of the nineteen northern states where the lingual-franca is Hausa amidst a largely Muslim population, Plateau state is geo-politically located in the north-central or middle-belt zone of Nigeria that houses national minorities who are largely Christians (Higazi 2011). The animosity that characterizes inter-group relations is pronounced in social attitudes, politics and patterns of life all of which have made mobilization for conflict along ethno-religious lines attractive. Plateau became highly cosmopolitan as a result of migration from across Nigeria during the early colonial period sequel to the industrial scale tin and columbite mining (Simbine 2004). This translated into a numerical strength for Christians in Plateau because of the influx of many Igbo and Yoruba migrants. Muslims mostly from the North and Hausa-speaking settled in the lowlands than on the high Plateau (Higazi 2011).

Therefore, with migration-induced development came the (in)advertent sowing of the seeds of future conflict as result of migration and mobility of labour that makes it comparable to Cote d'Ivoire and Katanga in Congo. This culminated in the establishment of Jos and other mining settlements by the European patrons of the Royal Niger Company (RNC) between 1902 and 1913 while it became a township in 1915 (Simbine 2004). The indigenous people are the Berom, Angas, Geomai, Afizere and Rukuba. At the inception of the burgeoning industry, mining and colonialism led to the dispossession of the Berom and Anaguta of their valuable farmlands. One of the consequences of the rapid social and economic transformation of Jos was the marginalization and dislocation of its initial inhabitants in the colonial economy and social order. According to the national census of 2006, Plateau state has a population of 3.1 million people (Higazi 2011).

The background to the Jos crises cannot be delinked from the incorporation of the inhabitants of the Plateau into the North by the British colonialists. Since then, there has been a persistent struggle by the Plateau peoples to assert autonomy from what they consider to be Northern internal colonialism (Logams 2004) in sort of counter-hegemonic move. The trajectory of contemporary Plateau state could be traced to 1967 as part of the termination of Nigeria's regional system. Also, in 1976, there was further alteration of the polity with the creation of Benue state while the present is what has remained after the

creation of Nassarawa state in 1996. Since independence, there have been six occasions of the creation of states (1963, 1967, 1976, 1987, 1991 and 1996). Current events in Plateau state indicate that the creation of more states in Nigeria has continuously created new minorities and majorities in the new states including Plateau state.

Contemporary context and actors of the Jos crises since 2001 present itself as a potpourri of conflict causes which is a departure from pre-Biafran war relationship between the Hausa/Fulani and the Beroms who jointly killed thousands of Igbos on the mining fields during the anti-Igbo pogrom (Higazi 2011). While, to some, it is a religious conflict; others see clashing perspectives on ownership of land, while others lay emphasis on the indigene-settler dichotomy as the denominator of the crises. It is apposite to state this because most literature on the Jos crises presents crises in Jos as unprecedented which obliterates the killing of the Igbos by the joint forces of the Beroms and their Hausa/Fulani neighbours when the going was good between them. The long peace enjoyed in Plateau since that period (1966-1994 and 2001), while many other cities in the North like Kaduna, Kano and Bauchi amongst others experienced intermittent and violent ethno-religious conflicts, makes the turn of events resulting in the protracted crises since 2001 unprecedented.

The conflict of 2001 which was just two years into civilian rule speaks to the frailty and fragility of relations between the Muslims (settlers) and Christians (indigenes) and how religion and ethnicity are used for violence mobilisation in tensed communities. Ostensibly, two incidences can be identified as the cause(s) of the 2001 conflict. First was the appointment of Alhaji Muktar Usman Mohammed on June 20th 2001 as the coordinator of National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) for Jos North local government which the indigenes rejected because he was not an indigene of Jos North. The second was the attempt of one Miss Rhoda Nyam on Friday 7th September to pass through a congregation of Muslims during Jummat prayers at Congo Russia area and denial her of right of passage by Muslims. Episodic instances of violence continued in 2002 and 2004 and culminated in declaration of a state of emergency and a temporary replacement of democratically elected office holders on the 18th of May 2004 by former president Olusegun Obasanjo.

The two causes of the 2001 violent conflicts which have defined Plateau state and Jos in particular can be analysed as religious (value) and political (resource) driven. Being a Muslim or a Christian in Jos has an identity and socio-political import beyond spirituality. Therefore, it becomes predictable that a Christian will almost likely be an indigene while a Muslim will likely be a settler. These two issues are revealing of the dominance of clientelism, patron-client relationships or neo-patrimonialism and ethnic populism. Hyden (2006) describes clientelism as a form of informal institution governed by personalisation of public office for selfish personal and/or group interests. This is theorised as the economy of affection that thrives on reciprocities. Richard Joseph in his treatise on Nigeria's second republic gave the concept of patrimonialism a nuanced explanation by describing it as prebendalism. Joseph (1987) prefers the use of prebendalism to other concepts like clientelism, patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism by depicting it as a situation in which:

Offices of state are allocated and then exploited as benefits by the officeholders, and legitimated through satisfaction of demands of specific subsets of the general population. "In short, prebendalism allows officers of the state to enjoy the benefits that justifiably

come with office, but only as long as they share the spoils (loot) with their communities” (Hyden 2006:96)

Specifically, the tension and controversy of over the appointment of Alhaji Muktar Usman Mohammed reflects the extent of reliance on prebendal relations which has bred exclusive rather than inclusive politics in Nigeria. Therefore, going by the sequence of events before the escalation of violence in 2001, the conflict can therefore be located in the context of local political economy and deep-seated animosity. In such circumstances, ethnically exclusive prebendal relationships become the sources of seeking legitimacy by political elites in such communities.

Again in 2008, the post-election violence of elections into Jos North marked the beginning of another rounds of violent conflicts. According to Ostein (2009), the conflict started at the collation stage of the electoral process and lasted from November 28 to 29 when the army and mobile police came to quell it. However, it was localised to Jos North alone. Amidst calls for another declaration of a state of emergency by the Hausa/Fulani community, the federal government chose to send the then Army Chief of Staff, General Dambazzau to evaluate the situation. Higazi (2011) reports that this was followed by the posting of Major General Saleh Maina to take full security control of Plateau state as head of the Joint-Task-Force (JTF) comprising all security agencies. However, despite the existence of the JTF, isolated and silent killings have continued while group violence has reduced.

From the preceding, ethnic populism and ethnically exclusive patron client relations provide a summary for the sources of representation, expression and legitimacy by the elites in Plateau state and Jos in particular like most polities in Nigeria. The revival of irredentism by the indigenes could be traced to the desire of the Plateau peoples made up of over 30 recognised ethno-linguistic groups to change their minority in the regional and national contexts which they consistently resented but could not change since the 1950s until the advent of the fourth-republic which has enabled them to control political power and conferred a majority status on them in reversal of their minority status prior to the advent of the fourth-republic. This brings to the fore the opinion of Schaffer (2004:415) that: “in situations where economic and political resource is too scarce to be used for reaching political and economic goals, elites can construct conflictive sceneries and mobilize people along ethnic and religious lines.”

The continued salience of ethnicity as a causal variable of explaining many conflicts in Africa cannot be ignored, despite persuasions to de-emphasise ethno-political explanations of African conflicts (Hyden 2006). Ethnicity has returned as a form of governmentality that thrives on the: “classification and categorisation, including both self-classification and the classification of (and by) others” (Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov 2004:002). This has led to an interplay between self-identification and external categorisation and directing interests to the various levels of (individual, interactional, and institutional) in formal and informal contexts (Jenkins 1997).

Democratising states in Asia, Latin America, Africa and post Cold War Europe such as Russia are faced with the implications of its (mis)management especially before, during and after elections. In such instances, the constructivist notion of ethnicity which functions as an instrumental adaptation of shifting economic and political circumstances return to the fore. The instrumental use of ethnicity in the interactions between the indigenes and settlers reflects the constructivists tendency that: “take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogenous groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists

of social conflicts and fundamental units of social analysis.” (Antaki and Widdicombe 1997:2). This represents a rejection of earlier held notions expressed by (Gurr and Lichbach 1979) that the more democratised a society is, the less prone it will be to domestic conflicts that will threaten its core. This is because host-settlers conflicts as a form of ethnicity continue to threaten not only Nigeria’s democracy but its core existence after fourteen years of uninterrupted democracy. This underscores the fact that most of these conflicts are deep-rooted and have become intractable. This informed the suggestion by late dictator of Libya Muammar Ghaddafi that: “The model that fits Nigeria is the Yugoslav model . . . which included several peoples, like Nigeria, and then these peoples gained independence and the Yugoslav union was ended in peace.” (Suberu 2010: 460).

The Jos crisis has an indigene-settler context because it involves members of two ethnic-nationalities and it can also be described as a proxy conflict between these two ethnic nationalities based on the reprisals it generates. Indigenes are those who claim autochthony as basis for rights to land and appointments to public offices. On the other hand, settlers are those even if born where they live remain without any customary rights to land or political appointments (Mamdani 2010). This has given the conflict a indigene-settler tag with the (Beroms, Anaguta and Afizere) pitched against the settlers (Hausa/Fulani or Jasawa). This has informed the conceptualisation of the Jos crisis as intractable and deep-rooted. This is a conflict that has seemingly defied virtually all efforts made in resolving it. Due to the violent character of the conflict, the military has found itself saddled with the responsibility of permanently ensuring peace and order in the conflict-ridden state.

The Scenarios

First Scenario

Higazi (2011) reports that in January 2010, conflict erupted again around the old mining sites which claimed about 1000 lives. At least over 200 Hausa/Fulani (Muslims settlers) were killed in Kuru Jenta which informed a reprisal in March that led to the massacre of over 300 Beroms (Christians indigenes) in Dogo Nahawa. The Hausa/Fulani also suffered high casualties in Barkin Ladi and Jos South LGs. Many of the killings were done crudely leaving bodies of victims mutilated.

One in the cycle of violent exchanges between the indigenes and the settlers in the Jos crises occurred on March 7 2010 in a village called Dogo Nahawa. According to Suleiman (2010:27):

‘People suspected to be Fulani herdsmen had invaded the village and two other neighbouring ones, Ratsa and Zot with genocide on their minds. The invaders who held the victims hostage between 3.am and 6 am set fire to their houses and waited with guns, daggers and knives for their victims to rush out. As residents scampered to safety, they ran into the hands of the invaders who hacked them down. And the marauders did not discriminate, they beheaded men, women and kids as young as two years. . . . by the time they retreated, three communities had been reduced to rubble with the blood of hundreds forming thick, red clot on the ground.’

In this particular instance, the symbol of civilian authority in Plateau State retired Col. Jonah Jang and Major-General Saleh Maina openly engaged in media altercations (Omonobi 2010). According to

Omonobi (2010:10) an appointee of the state governor who is a Christian and Berom claimed to have sent a text-message to alert the GOC of the attack in the village on the governor's instruction long before the attack took place. However, the GOC revealed that the message came in at exactly 03:41:38 (19 minutes to 4 am) while he has already deployed his men to the village as the hours of 02:45 an hour before the message was received. Unfortunately, this did not stop an attack and the attendant loss of lives and property. The residents were for once united in blaming the symbol of military presence in the crisis in the person of the General Officer Commanding (GOC) who happened to be a Muslim of the Hausa-Fulani ethnic nationality. Omonobi (2010) reports that both the Beroms who pride themselves as indigenes and the Hausa-Fulani settlers felt General Maina was not protecting their interests. They labelled him; *killer, villain and supporter* of Muslims against Christians.

Second Scenario

The scene was at the mass burial of villagers made up of mostly women and children in Barki-Ladi and Riyom local government areas. As the bodies were being interred unknown attackers alleged to be Fulani cattle-rearers rained bullets on mourners and at the end, the Senator representing Jos North Senator Gyang Dalypop Dantong and the Majority Leader of the Plateau State House of Assembly including 100 others were shot dead (Idegu 2012). Speaking after the attack, a legislator in the Plateau State House of Assembly who hails from Berom, Honourable Daniel Dem who was at the scene of the attack relayed his observation on the Security Task Force (STF) thus:

Without them, this situation would have been worse. They actually helped during the attack in Maseh while we were doing the burial. They came there with their armoured tank and as people ran for safety, the STF shot from inside the armoured car twice. This scared the gunmen from coming after us. If the STF had shown their superior power earlier than that, the gunmen would not have attacked us during the mass burial. I wish the STF had acted faster than they did, but all the same they commendation and I'm urging them to do more to help our people.

From the two instances, it can be seen that the loss of lives could not be prevented despite military response in the first and presence in the second. However, while the elected governor blamed the GOC for the loss of lives in the first case-study, an elected legislator commended the military for mitigating the loss of lives in the second instance. Comparably, the quantity and quality of lives lost in the second and the manner in which it took place can be considered more gruelling and chilling than the first one. It is also discernible that the challenge posed by the inaccessibility of the first terrain was not taken into critical consideration unlike the second one where the attack took place in the presence of the STF and over 100 lives were still lost.

However, despite the presumed improved performance of the military in the second case-study, there have been calls for the withdrawal of the military split along the indigene-settler divide (Jimoh and Badsh-Mukhtar 2012). On this, the Beroms are believed to be receiving the support of Jonah Jang the State governor¹ in spite of the pervasive insecurity in the state.

These two case-studies raise intellectual and operational concerns on the role of deployed national security-forces in communities embroiled in identity-based conflicts within an unimagined nation-state

like Nigeria. This is because of the ambiguity of the mandate and the (un)met expectations of the warring parties in such communities like the indigenes and settlers in Plateau state make the deployed-force to appear like a scalar force. This makes it difficult for such a security-force to satisfactorily carry out any mandate given to it because a party in the conflict has a fixated notion that it is a partisan force. This perception runs contrary to the founding ideals of post-colonial public ideology legitimising state militaries, civil service and courts as belonging to all and not any particular ethnic-nationality (Enloe 1978). This informs the deployment of a country's military by the central government to communal conflicts under the guise of acting neutrally. However, the estimation of the performance of such deployments since the fourth-republic commenced fall short of the definition of conflict management as: "... the positive and constructive handling of differences and divergence" (Harmis and Reilly 1998: 18 quoted in Jinadu 2007:7). This is because a positive and constructive handling of differences should produce peaceful relations between the parties in conflict on one hand, and the warring communities and the representatives of nation-state on the other hand. Indeed this requires the cooperation of all parties in conflict and it is at this juncture that the perception of ethnic security dilemma held against each other and military by the warring parties becomes a hurdle to peace and security.

Militaristic Quest for Peace and Security in Indigene-Settler Crises of Plateau Nigeria

The need to ensure sustainable peace, order, stability and security in communities recovering from violent conflicts or those intermittently hit by armed violence poses no mean challenge to the government of such countries. This precipitated the return of the military to the public space consequent upon the inability of the Police and the high frequency of domestic conflicts many of which are rooted in identity contests. While a lot has been done to humanise the intervention of the military giving birth to such terms like *humanitarian intervention* and *Right to Protect R2P* (Gorman 2011), not much attention has been given to the need to ensure that peace in many post-conflict communities that have experienced military occupation is positive, sustainable and conducive for development. Consequently the peace in many post-conflict communities in Nigeria has been far from positive.

This raises questions on the means and instruments of achieving this peace and why this peace has been epileptic and negative in many of such communities. Richmond (2006) observes that despite the allure of liberal peace which is rooted in democratisation, rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets and neo-liberal development, it is still laden with consequences which have created the opposite of what it desires in a number of places even after the processes of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) and the conduct of elections. While this is obtainable in large-scale conflicts, the cases of communal conflicts have not received such magnitude of attentions, hence, in many cases, underlying issues of communal conflicts are left to fester once the military achieves order while inter-group animosity deepens until renewed violence breaks-out.

While the preference of the existence of peace and security built on military presence (first-generation) in such communities like Jos reflects the governmentalities of regimes in Nigeria since 1999, recent developments challenge the efficacy of this approach and calls to question the over-reliance on solely first-generation approaches that are top-down, designed and implemented by people outside the conflict setting. For instance the setting up of Joint-Task-Force (JTF) or Security Task Force (STF) illustrates this going by their conduct in post-conflict or conflict-ridden communities. As

demonstrated by the gravity of the two instances out of many of such in Plateau, an integrated and collaborative approach towards the enhancement of peace and security can go a long way in aiding the activities of the military in the state.

Securing Peace in Plateau: A Case for Second-Generation Approaches

Hills (2009) observes that despite its absence, security still dominates in conflicting and post-conflict communities. This is because inhabitants must be sure that they are free from forcible displacement, rape, robbery, kidnapping and disappearances, torture and getting killed. This brings back the centrality of the state at all tiers of governance in the contemporary notion of security summed up as human security and defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as freedom from fear and want including the provision of food, water, health and environmental protection. Bellamy (2003) enumerates broader dimensions of security to include: military, political, societal, economic and environmental. These notions of security are seen in this piece as *hard-ware* and *soft-ware security*. This must be designed and pursued in a context-specific manner that addresses the macro and micro factors sustaining violence (Collecta and Muggah 2009) in ethnically-split and war-torn communities like Plateau State. A solo-run in achieving this based on first-generation approaches faces multi-faceted challenges going by the current realities in many African countries such as Nigeria where the power of the central authority to control resources and instruments of violence are no more the exclusive preserve of the state.

Conclusion

Despite cries from a side in the conflict that the military should be withdrawn, extant thinking on security especially concerning conflict-ridden communities like Plateau state require a robust, participatory and inclusive approach in the pursuit of peace and security which requires both militaristic and non-militaristic contributions. As a step-forward in promoting peace and security in Plateau state, second generation approaches (Bellamy 2003) are imperative. In contradistinction to first-generation approaches that are top-down, second-generation approaches are consciously drawn to meet realities on ground inclusive of individual and collective incentives to enhance compliance.

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(Footnotes)

- 1 According to Retired General Jeremiah Useni in a newspaper interview, the Governor of Plateau State is the real problem of the state because he does not cooperate with the Federal Government on resolving the crises and he is behind the calls for the withdrawal of the military from the state.