

**Corruption and
Governance in Nigeria:
An Assessment of the
Buhari Administration,
2015-2023**

African Journal of Stability
& Development
Vol 17 No. 2, Nov. 2025
pp. 1070-1089

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Abstract

Nigeria gained independence in 1960 and the global expectation was that the country would experience rapid development, given its human and mineral resources. Over six decades later, the country is yet to break free from the shackles of underdevelopment. A review of the literature on Nigeria shows that corruption and bad governance are mainly responsible for its developmental challenges. The success of Muhammadu Buhari in the 2015 presidential polls was seen as a watershed in the political and developmental annals of the country, given the credibility of the election and the

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trust reposed in Buhari to make good his electioneering campaign of ridding Nigeria of corruption and to govern according to the dictates of the law. At the end of his second term in office in 2023, Nigeria seemed to be more steeped in corruption with good governance remaining a mirage. Employing the historical approach and with a review of secondary data on the country, the study examined the Buhari Administration (2015-2023) and assessed it poorly in terms of its anti-corruption crusade and adherence to the principles of the rule of law. It found that the administration was more autocratic than preceding administrations and was not sincere in adhering to its promise to curb corruption in the country. The study urged the Nigerian government to develop the will to tackle corruption and govern democratically.

Keywords: Buhari administration, corruption, democracy, development, governance, Nigeria.

Introduction

Many factors, including ethnicity, religious intolerance, autocratic leadership, debt burden, misappropriation of funds, and policy somersaults, have been proffered for Nigeria's seeming inability to escape from the quagmire of underdevelopment (Adenuga, 2022a; Adenuga et al., 2023; Adenuga et al., 2019; Yagboyaju, 2017). However, all these factors can be summed up in the twin evils of corruption and bad governance (Abada & Ngwu, 2019; Adegbami & Adepoju, 2017; Anazoda, et al., 2015). Nigeria has been plagued with these evils since independence, and every succeeding administration, whether civilian or military, has been characterised by corruption and bad governance. Nigeria is often at the centre of most discussions on corruption as it is seen as a major deadweight preventing the country from rising from the brackish waters of underdevelopment despite her immense mineral and human resources.

Against the above backdrop, it was with great expectations that Muhammadu Buhari, a retired Army General and former Military Head of State, was sworn into office as the Executive President of the country on 29 May, 2015. Buhari had achieved the uncommon African feat of unseating

an incumbent President, Goodluck Jonathan, through the ballot box. His victory at the polls was ascribed to his electoral promise to rid the country of corruption and govern in accordance with constitutional dictates (Adegbami & Uche, 2016; Mbara, 2019; Thompson, 2020). The Nigerian citizenry, fed up with the ever-rising costs of living, occasioned by corruption and bad governance, decided to put their trust in a man whom they believed has the will to fight corruption to a standstill. Nigerians were made to remember that the military regime, which Buhari headed between 31 December 1983 and 27 August 1985, had waged a relentless warfare against indiscipline in all its ramifications, including corrupt activities. Buhari and his associates also made rebuttals against views that he was incapable of governing democratically, judging by the high autocratic tendencies he exhibited as a military Head of State. He affirmed that he was autocratic because he headed a military regime and that as an elected Executive President, every one of his actions would be guided by the principle of the rule of law (Adegbami & Uche, 2016; Mbara, 2019). Hope was thus raised that corruption had met its Waterloo with the swearing in of Buhari into office and that good governance is assured. Buhari left office in 2023, yet the country seems to be more steeped in corruption than before. It is thus imperative to study the challenges of corruption and good governance under the administration to better position the country to tackle these impediments.

This study has five sections. The first section is the introduction, the second section deals with conceptual discourse on corruption and good governance, while the third section takes a historical overview of the manifestations of corruption and bad governance in Nigeria since its independence in 1960. The fourth section examines and assesses how the Buhari administration fared concerning its promise to rid the country of corruption and bad governance. The fifth section is the concluding section of the chapter.

Corruption and Good Governance- A Conceptual Discourse

Corruption, like most concepts, has no universally accepted definition. This is informed by the fact that what is considered a corrupt act in a country might be viewed as a norm in another. In many countries, acts including appropriation of public property for private use, bribery, cronyism, embezzlement of funds, expropriation, extortion, fraud, influence peddling,

and misappropriation of funds would be listed as acts of corruption (Morris, 2011; Tytko, et al., 2020), while some of these acts are conducted in the public and private domains of some countries as normal and expected requirements. Wathne (2021) has succinctly shown that what would cause widespread condemnations as ignoble and corrupt in some climes might pass off as legitimate and the expected in Nigeria. Distinctions are also made between different forms and types of corruption, including political, economic and bureaucratic corruption (Hollstein, 2018; Huntington, 2017). However, there is a consensus that corruption, in all its forms and manifestations, has negative consequences for socio-economic and political development.

Despite the many and varied definitions of the term, there are some definitions that seem to find general acceptance. Colin Nye's definition of corruption as "behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (Satyal, 2023) remains a major foundation for subsequent definitions of the concept. The conceptualisation of corruption shows that it is viewed as majorly occurring in the public domain, and it involves a public official using their office to unjustly derive a personal gain. However, corruption is not limited to the public sector but crosses every sector, and it can be viewed as any intentional act involving the contravention of acceptable legal dictates, which may be directed towards fulfilling nepotistic inclinations (Sartor & Beamish, 2020).

Good governance became a buzzword and a major literature focus in the post-Cold War era. The divergence between capitalism/democracy and socialism/autocracy in the Cold War era did not allow comprehensiveness of discussions on good governance. However, the end of the Cold War and the third wave of democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s made good governance a major focus of international organisations and brought the full beam of research on the concept (Dijkstra, 2018; Doornbos, 2019).

Simply put, governance refers to the process of administering through the formulation and implementation of policies, and by extension, good governance refers to the process of making and implementing good policies. There is, however, no generally accepted definition of good governance,

but it is widely agreed that the concepts of democracy and good governance are interlinked. Democracy and good governance share similar features, and one cannot be discussed in the absence of the other. Most discussions on good governance see it as a system of democratic government which promotes accountability, equity, inclusiveness, participation, responsiveness, rule of law and transparency (Addink, 2019; Bandelow & Johanna, 2022; Helliwell et al., 2018; Keping, 2018; Scholar, 2019). The World Bank (2007) gives six indicators for measuring good governance to include the level of citizens' participation in the composition of government and formulation of policies; political stability and absence of violence; effectiveness; quality of regulatory functions; adherence to the principle of the rule of law; and the ability to control corruption.

From the above descriptions, it becomes obvious that democracy is the basic prerequisite for good governance and that good governance is the measuring index for democratic governments. Without democracy, it is impossible to achieve good governance, and without good governance, democracy becomes a farce. The absence or insufficiency of the features of good governance in any democracy makes such an autocracy. In this wise, many democracies have been dubbed 'autocratic democracies' as they lack the basic characteristics of good governance.

The definitions of corruption and good governance also reveal a significant nexus between the two concepts. Corruption has been identified as one of the greatest threats to good governance, and the ability to control corruption is a main feature of good governance. In essence, the more corrupt a state is, the less the prospect of good governance and good governance guarantees the reduction of corruption. Myint (2000) provides a formula establishing the relationship between corruption and good governance as $C=R+D-A$ where C is corruption, R is rent, D is discretionary powers of government, and A is the level of accountability. Myint succinctly shows that corruption thrives where the government is rent seeking, has high discretionary powers to formulate and implement policies without input from the citizenry and where accountability is lacking. However, corruption becomes reduced with decreased discretionary powers and greater accountability of government.

Governance and Corruption in Nigeria: A Historical Survey

Nigeria, since independence in 1960, has always been bedevilled by the twin evils of corruption and bad governance, even going by the minimalist description of corruption as the usage of public office to satisfy selfish interests and good governance as free, fair and periodic elections; inclusiveness and participation; tolerance for opposing views; and adherence to the principle of the rule of law. Nigeria's first republic became short-lived because of the politics of ethnicity and nepotism that characterised it. The three major political parties, the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG), carved political empires out of the Northern, Eastern, and Western Regions, respectively, and shut out other political parties. Ethnicity, which promoted nepotism, became the major requirement for enjoying the full rights and privileges of citizens guaranteed by the 1960 independence and 1963 republican constitutions (Adenuga, 2022a; Adenuga et al., 2022; Azoro, et al., 2021; Okunola, et al., 2019). The elections in the republic were also fraught with irregularities aimed at crippling the opposition at both national and regional levels. The 15 January 1966 military coup, which sacked the republic, was reportedly carried out to save the country from corrupt, inept and bad leadership (Omotola, 2021; Tar & Zack-Williams, 2007).

The country was under military rule between 15 January 1966 and 1 October 1979 with different military regimes including the Aguiyi Ironsi regime (15 January 1966 to July 1966), the Yakubu Gowon regime (1 August 1966 to 29 July 1975), the Murtala Muhammed regime (29 July 1975 to 13 February 1976) and the Olusegun Obasanjo regime (13 February 1976 to 30 September 1979). The various military regimes took Nigeria to worse dimensions of corruption and bad governance than the civilian leadership they displaced. The very coup that brought Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi into power was seen as ethnic in nature, as the ringleaders were mostly from the Eastern Region, while the Northern Region suffered the greatest casualties. Ironsi was also accused of nepotistic tendencies, given his refusal to prosecute the main leaders of the January coup, who were his kinsmen and his bid to turn the country into a unitary state, which was seen to favour his own ethnic group (Odunlami & Oyeranmi, 2020; Osadola et al., 2024). The counter-coup of 1 August 1966 was, as the name indicates, a reprisal by

the Northern Region against the Eastern Region, which saw Gen. Yakubu Gowon, from the Northern Region, replacing Aguyi Ironsi, who was killed in the coup. Thus, military rule deepened ethnicity and nepotism in Nigeria. The military had premised its intervention on the need to save the country from the centrifugal forces that had characterised the First Republic. It was posited that the fixation on ethnic and regional considerations was at the root of corruption and bad governance in the failed Republic. The military prided itself as a cohesive organisation with the capacity to promote unity in the country and, by extension, one able to provide a leadership that eschews corruption and ensures good governance. The issues that accompanied the January and July 1966 coups showed that the Nigerian military leadership was more steeped in the politics of ethnicity and regionalism than the civilian class that it displaced. Thus, from 1966, there were pointers that military rule would engender the same or worse experiences of corruption and bad leadership than what obtained in the First Republic. Personality clash between Yakubu Gowon and Emeka Ojukwu, the Military Governor of the Eastern Region, was also a major impetus for the devastating Civil War in the country between 6 July, 1967 and 15 January, 1970, which further served to create deep seated acrimony amongst the various groups in the country (Inyang, 2017; McNeil, 2011; Omaka, et al., 2021; Otiono, 2021).

Gowon was accused of profligacy in the handling of the national resources. Gen. Murtala Muhammed, who ousted Gowon in a palace coup on 29 July, 1975, defended the removal of his predecessor on the endemic nature of corruption in the country that the Gowon-led regime allowed (Adegbulu, 2000; Ogundiya, 2016). Muhammed subsequently embarked on the purge of the country's civil service, which had allegedly turned into a cesspool of corruption (Ewgu & Mshelia, 2023). He also condemned Gowon's inordinate ambition to 'rule for life', given his non-commitment to the transition to democracy timetables (Adegbulu, 2000; Ogundiya, 2016). Murtala was assassinated in an unsuccessful coup on 13 February 1976, but his successor, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo carried on with the implementation of his predecessor's ideals and handed over power to an elected civilian government on 1 October, 1979. It is, however, pertinent to note that both Muhammed and Obasanjo were also accused of repressing human rights and of profligacy (Ekeh, 2010; Ezeogidi, 2020).

Nigeria's Second Republic (1 October, 1979 to 31 December, 1983) was also fraught with corruption and bad governance. In the first instance, the Shehu Shagari administration was alleged to have come into power through a manipulated electoral process (Adenuga, 2009; Daniel, 2015). The administration also plunged the country into needless debts, which often ended up in private pockets. In addition, the administration used the security apparatus of government to haunt real and perceived political opposition. Human rights violations became rife, and political repression became the order of the day. Endemic corruption stifled economic development, and bad governance led to political instability (Egbule, 2019; Ijewereme, 2015; Ojo, et al., 2020). The climax was the 1983 general elections in which electoral malpractices were brazenly carried out to further move the country into a one-party system, as against the constitutionally prescribed multiparty system. Unsurprisingly, the military struck to remove the administration from power on 31 December, 1983, citing corruption and bad governance on the part of the civilian leadership as the reasons for their actions (Omotola, 2021; Yahaya & Bello, 2020).

Nigeria was also to be governed by four military regimes between 31 December, 1983 and 29 May, 1999. The Buhari regime (31 December, 1983 to 27 August, 1985) was characterised by the drive to move Nigeria out of the cesspool of corruption the preceding administrations and regimes had plunged the country into. However, draconian decrees and edicts, such as Decree 4 of 1984, which gave security operatives unrestrained powers to arrest, detain, and imprison critics of the regime, made it unpopular, and the overthrow of the regime by the Ibrahim Babangida-led coup on 27 August, 1985 was celebrated by the country (Bourne, 2018; Mbara, 2019). The Ibrahim Babangida regime (27 August, 1985 to 27 August, 1993) allegedly turned corruption into a statecraft. Babangida was alleged to have channelled the major part of the Gulf Oil Windfall into private pockets, and oil blocs also ended up in private hands. Critics of the regime were either bribed into silence, imprisoned or disappeared entirely and the regime was also implicated in the assassination of Dele Giwa, one of the country's brightest journalists. The annulment of the 1993 presidential election, described by both international and local observers as free and fair was to be the high point in a regime often criticised for corruption and human

rights abuses as Babangida was forced to step aside on 27 August, 1993, after handing power over to an Interim National Government (ING) led by Chief Ernest Shonekan (Azoro, et al., 2021; Mbeke-Ekanem, 2020; Njoku, 2019).

A palace coup organised by Gen. Sani Abacha, the Minister of Defence in the ING, swept the government away on 17 November, 1993, and Abacha was to govern the country until his death on 8 June, 1998. His regime was criticised as the most repressive and dictatorial in the history of the country. He imprisoned Chief MKO Abiola, the presumed winner of the annulled 1993 presidential election, who sought to reclaim his mandate. The regime also received widespread condemnation for killing Ken Saro and other Ogoni activists who led a campaign to make the government more responsible to the oil-rich Niger Delta, the source of the country's wealth, yet one of the most underdeveloped regions in the country. The regime allegedly sponsored the extra-judicial killings of many of its critics, including the chieftain of NADECO, Pa Alfred Rewane and Chief Mrs. Kudirat Abiola, one of the wives of MKO Abiola. The regime, allegedly, was more corrupt than its successors (Adegbulu, 2000; Courtois, 2018; Ojo, et al., 2020; Osundare, 2019) Abacha's successor, Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar, handed over the reins of power to a democratically elected government on 29 May, 1999.

Successive regimes in the Fourth Republic have also trodden the paths of corruption and bad governance. The Olusegun Obasanjo administration (29 May, 1999 to 28 May, 2007) was accused of directing the security forces to commit extra-judicial killings, such as the invasions of Odi in Bayelsa State and Zarki-Biam in Benue State. The highhandedness of the President could also be seen in his refusal to honour the Supreme Court's ruling that seized allocations to Lagos State be released. Many of the top officials in the administration, including his Vice, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, were also indicted on charges of corrupt acts. The elections conducted by the administration were also adjudged to be fraught with malpractices (Adenuga & Akingbulu, 2023; Akuva, 2016; John, 2011; Okafor, 2011). While the Umaru Yar'Adua administration (29 May, 2007 to 2010) was lauded for being better in terms of governance, the administration was also accused of not adhering to constitutional dictates in appointments, and some extra-judicial killings (Adenuga & Johnson-Odusanya, 2024; Eme & Ogbochie,

2013; John, 2011). The Goodluck Jonathan administration (2010-29 May 2015) was allegedly very corrupt, as most of the top officials in the administration greatly enriched themselves from contracts awarded through their offices. The administration was also alleged to have committed many human rights infringements (Johnson & Salau, 2019; Ocheje, 2018; Ojo et al., 2020; Stober, 2019).

The Muhammadu Buhari Administration (2015-2023)

The 2015 general elections marked a watershed in Nigerian politics as it was regarded as the freest and fairest since the country attained independence in 1960 (Nwagwu, et al. 2018; Onuh & Ike, 2021). International and local election observers agreed that the people's votes counted, a rare feat in the country's electoral history. Indeed, for the very first time in the country's history, there was an alternation of power between a ruling party and an opposition party. The promise of the All Progressives Congress (APC)'s presidential candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, to curb corruption, which had eaten deep into the very fabric of the country, and ensure good governance, was seen as a major reason for his victory over the incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan of the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP). But how did the Buhari administration fare on its promise?

President Buhari's anti-corruption crusade was hinged on the employment of four strategies—the introduction of the Treasury Single Account (TSA), compulsory Biometric Verification Numbers for all account holders, whistle-blowing policy, and the intensification of prosecutions by the anti-corruption agencies (Adeagbo & Oladeji, 2019; Anya & Iwanger, 2019; Arowolo & Olaniyan, 2018). The TSA is a policy that demands a unified structure of bank accounts for all governmental agencies and institutions to ensure better monitoring of incomes and expenditures. The TSA was thus designed to block the loopholes through which public officials embezzle public funds. The Central Bank of Nigeria (2016:2) shows that the policy was to:

Enthroned centralised, transparent and accountable revenue management; Facilitate effective cash management; Ensure cash availability; Promote efficient management of domestic borrowing at minimal cost; Allow optimal investment of idle cash; Block loopholes in revenue management; Establish an

efficient disbursement and collection mechanism for Government funds; Improve liquidity reserve; and Eliminate operational inefficiency and costs associated with maintaining multiple accounts across multiple financial institutions.

The policy yielded tangible results, including saving about \$78 million on a monthly basis (Chukwuemeka, 2020). The implementation of the BVN policy, commenced by the Jonathan administration in 2014, was further intensified by the Buhari administration as a security measure to authenticate the identities of bank account owners in the country. The BVN policy protects against identity theft and ensures the workability of the TSA. The whistle-blowing policy led to an increase in the exposure of financial crimes, and within a year of its commencement in 2016, it had helped in the recovery of over \$160 million (Makinde, 2018; Salihu, 2019). The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission also witnessed an increase in its number of convictions from 103 in 2015 to 1305 in 2020 (Jamo, 2021).

Despite these gains, the overall performance of the administration in tackling corruption seemed unimpressive for some vital reasons. The administration was accused of politicising its anti-corruption crusade to target and bring members of the opposition to heel (Amannah & Adeyeye, 2018; Mbara, 2019). Adams Oshiomhole, a former National Chairman of the APC, was quoted to have advised members of the opposition who desired the ‘forgiveness of their sins’ to join the ruling party (Thompson, 2020). Indeed, the list of former PDP members who were being prosecuted by the EFCC but who are now stalwarts in the APC includes Abdullahi Adamu, Aliyu Wammako, Godswill Akpabio, Orji Uzor Kalu, Rotimi Amaechi, Musiliu Obanikoro, Timpere Silva, Late Otunba Alao Akala, and Femi Fani-Kayode (Thompson, 2020).

A corollary of the above is the penchant of the administration to defend and ‘forgive’ friends of the administration accused and convicted of corrupt acts. This made a mockery of its avowed promise to eliminate corruption from the country. For example, President Muhammadu Buhari was alleged to have tried to browbeat the country’s Senate over the insistence of the latter to investigate Babachir Lawal, the former Secretary to the Federal Government, on his award of dubious contracts to a company he has controlling interests in against due process and ethical processes (Ibrahim,

2022; Obe, 2019; Stober, 2019). The decision of the administration to grant presidential pardon to Jolly Nyame, a former Governor of Taraba State, and Joshua Dariye, a former Governor of Plateau State, caused local and international public to doubt the sincerity of the administration's anti-corruption crusade. Nyame and Dariye had been convicted in 2018 for corrupt acts running into billions of naira when they were Governors between 1999 and 2007 and sentenced to 12 and 10 years imprisonment respectively (Jamo, 2021). High-profile corruption cases involving prominent officials in the administration also brought the anti-corruption crusade of the administration into disrepute. These cases included that of Nsima Ekere, a former Managing Director of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), who was alleged to have mismanaged and misappropriated about ₦47 billion, while the former Accountant General of the Federation, Ahmed Idris, was accused of embezzling over ₦80 billion (Ibrahim, 2022).

President Buhari's recourse to withdrawals from the Excess Crude Account without due process being followed fuelled speculations of the administration hiding behind the anti-corruption crusade to perpetuate corruption (Chukwuemeka, 2020). The continued fuel subsidy regime by the administration also led to accusations of corruption against the administration. Buhari had criticised the Jonathan administration for using the fuel subsidy as a conduit pipe to corruptly enrich its associates, and he promised to bring the scam to an end if elected as president. However, the administration itself spent about ₦4 trillion to fund subsidy (Ibrahim, 2022; Nwogbo & Ighodalo, 2021). Accusations of gross corruption charges against the Ministry of Petroleum, which Buhari directly headed, also put the integrity of the anti-corruption crusade of the administration under a cloud of doubt (Mbara, 2019). Revelations that officials at all levels of government also hoarded relief materials during the Covid-19 pandemic for selfish political ends also made the anti-corruption crusade suffer an integrity deficit (Chidume, et al., 2021; Nwagbo, 2021).

Given the above, the Buhari administration has been described as being more corrupt than the preceding administrations (Amannah & Adeyeye, 2018; Chukwuemeka, 2020; Ibrahim, 2022). The ranking of the country by Transparency International also shows that the administration did not live up to expectations concerning the rolling back of the frontiers of corruption.

At the onset of the administration in 2015, out of 168 countries of the world studied, Nigeria was ranked 136. In the 2022 rankings, the country was placed in number 154 out of 180 countries studied. Comparatively, the administration did not do better in its fight against corruption than what it met on the ground.

The scorecard of the Buhari administration on good governance is also not impressive. His administration further confirmed the position of literature that a strong nexus exists between corruption and bad governance. Buhari, in his 2015 electoral campaign, had promised to govern in accordance with the principle of the rule of law, with its attendant notions of equality, supremacy of the law, and respect for fundamental human rights. Contrary to this promise, his administration promoted elitism, cowed the judiciary, and paid lip service to the protection of human rights. The policies of the administration had been criticised for being nepotistic and favouring a section of the country over the others. For example, his Rural Grazing Area (RUGA) policy had to be jettisoned amidst accusations that it was designed to give further political and economic ascendancy to the Fulani, the ethnic group to which the president belonged (Adenuga, 2022b; Ademola, 2020; Agbakwura & Awujo, 2020). Likewise, as shown earlier, his administration's anti-corruption seemed to target members of the opposition.

On 7 October 2016, the Department of State Services (DSS) invaded the homes of some Supreme and High Courts Judges, ostensibly to verify allegations of corruption made against these Judges. However, insinuations were rife that it was an attempt to cow the judiciary into submission (Mbara, 2019). The Buhari administration was also criticised for trying to muzzle criticism by sponsoring bills, including the 2015 Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, Etc) Act and the Twitter ban of 2021 (Oladapo & Ojebode, 2021). The administration, the main beneficiary of the free and fair election of 2015, was also accused of manipulating off-cycle elections in the post-2015 era and the 2019 general elections to retain power (Ugoh & Ukpere, 2019; Ugwueze, 2020). The militarised response of the Buhari administration to the #EndSARS protests, in which dozens of protesters were allegedly killed, injured, and arrested by security forces, also portrayed the administration as autocratic and despotic (Ani & Onu, 2024).

Conclusion

The twin evils of corruption and bad governance have been the albatross of Nigeria since her independence in 1960. Successive administrations/regimes had further entrenched these two evils. The promise of Muhammadu Buhari to combat corruption and ensure good governance played a major role in his victory in the 2015 general elections. Nigerians believed that Buhari possessed the moral fibre to stop corruption in its tracks and to make good his promise to rule according to the dictates of the principle of the rule of law.

The assessment of the Buhari administration has shown its anti-corruption crusade made some gains through the employment of some strategies, including the Treasury Single Account, compulsory Biometric Verification Numbers for all bank account holders, the whistle-blowing policy, and the intensification of prosecutions of corrupt officials. However, the politicisation of the crusade, coupled with the indictments of top officials of the administration in corruption charges, further bogged the country in the mire of corruption.

The assessment of the Buhari administration on its promise to ensure good governance was also not impressive. The administration can be criticised as promoting elitism, nepotism and has not governed according to the rule of law.

In conclusion, for any Nigerian government to effectively tackle the twin evils of corruption and bad governance in the country, the rule of law must be made a priority. Likewise, the politics of ethnicity, regionalism, and religion should be jettisoned, and the government should develop the will to clean the stable without minding whose ox is gored.

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